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Brief
I. Introduction
1) Parties and General Information
I. Parties
Heretoforth comes the Appellant, Mr. Andrew Barrett Mefford Stanger, pro-se,
(hereinafter: Son or Plaintiff), to submit his redone initial brief in this matter upon appeal to the
Idaho Supreme Court. Against the Respondent, Mr. John Darwin Stanger (an incapacitated
person by and through his Conservator, Christy Walbuck, of Client Fiduciary Services, and his
Guardian, Julie Robinson, of Seasons Care Management), (hereinafter: Father or Defendant).

II. Other Additional General Information
Moreover, while the Plaintiff acknowledges that he is being held to the same rules as an
Attorney, but respectfully requests that this Court understand, and somewhat allow for the fact
that the Plaintiff is a Pro-se pleader who is not an Attorney, nor had potential multiple years of
law school, legal practice, and/or practice in the courts. Moreover, to be put on judicial notice
that as far as Plaintiffs pleadings go, that under the United States Supreme Court Case of
Haines v. Kerner ("A prose complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers")

(id at 512), that pleadings made by Pro-se pleaders are to be

held to less stringent standards than those drafted by experienced lawyers.
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Furthermore, the Plaintiff hereby removes from consideration and argument, issues
lettered D, I, and J on the Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal, and adds issues numbered herein, 5 and

IO for this courts consideration and argument, and also clarifies and delineates issues numbered
herein as 11 and 12, that are lettered Kand L respectively, on the Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal.
Additionally, the Plaintiff under duress, involuntarily and in formal protest against such actions,
hereby and in accordance with this Court's unlawful and unconstitutional order of February 6 th
2014(Ref. No. 14-65) 1• Submits this current shortened copy of this brief which was initially filed
with extensive addendums upon this Court, as well as served upon the Defense, via mail, e-mail,
and on DVD-Rom Disc with the physical mailed copies of the brief, on January 2i'\ 2014.

2) Statement of the Case
I. Nature of the Case
This is not a case, as the Defendant's legal counsel suggests, which is frivolous and
unfounded in law and/or fact, nor an attempt by a loving, caring, and understanding disabled
adult male child who looks to the man, behind, beyond, and through his mask of disability and

1

See generally, Plaintiff/Appellant's Objection, Motion, And Memorandum For Reconsideration
In Opposition To This Court's Order Of February 6th, 2014, which is on file with this Court.
Also generally that of Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton making the same argument overall,
as well as specifically his line of: "There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than
that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is
exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To
deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is
above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves;
that men acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but
what they forbid.").
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mental illness. Yet at same time, still factors in that disability and mental illness as it relates to
that man whom is his birth Father. This case is not meant to attack, hurt, shame, ridicule, harass,
belittle, slander, mame, bankrupt, or punish, unless the requirements, and dictates of law so
require, and then, not beyond them, his disabled and mentally ill Father and their unique
relationship in any way. Nor is it an attempt to misuse or subvert the legal system, but is instead,
a case filled with, and surrounding volatile, painful, powerful, and sometimes illogical legal,
ethical, moral, and complex emotional situations, legalities and issues. Moreover, is a case that
involves a multitude of interlinking issues, from child support in general, to, specifically, the
continuation of child supp011 for a disabled adult child post-majority, as well as the negligence
of said child support, and veterans' dependent of post military benefits to which the adult child
is rightfully and legally entitled to, and as the legitimate birth child of the disabled and mentally
ill Father, under both State and Federal law. Additionally, that of issues are brought forward due
to the breach of oral contracts, surrounding some of the issues brought in the instant case.

II. Course of Proceedings
On August 1411 2012, the initial complaint, along with summons, offer of settlement,
Plaintiff's motion to seal, and a multitude of exhibits listed in its back pages, was filed with the
Ada County District Court Clerks via United States Postal Service(USPS), along with the
Plaintiff's already pre-separated and identical copy of the record listed above, which was
shipped back to the Plaintiff, after the clerk had opened a case file, assigned case number CvOC-2012-14496, and sealed all copies of the summons with the clerk's seal for service upon the
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Defendant During such time, as the clerk was filing the initial complaint after receiving it by
mail, the Plaintiff replaced two exhibits with updated copies of the same ones.
On August 24th 2012, the Defendant, whom was not yet adjudicated incapacitated until
sometime after September 5th, 2012, was served by Vicki Woodley (maiden; Mefford, the
Plaintiff's mother), a copy of the amended complaint, the summons, all exhibits including the
two replacement ones, which would be sent to the Court the same date, with the Affidavit of
Service, and amended complaint via mail for the record, via USPS certified mail return receipt
requested, restricted delivery and adult signature required. The Affidavit of Service was signed
and notarized, with a copy of it included in the Defendant's envelope, as well as sent to the Court
for the record as noted above. The Defendant, whom was not yet adjudicated incapacitated until
sometime after September 5th, 2012, personally received Service of Process on the 27th of
August 2012, and returned the USPS return receipt, which arrived at the Plaintiff's USPS Post
Office box, and was filed via fax with the Court Clerk's office, with instructions to attach it to the
previously mailed Affidavit of Service shortly thereafter.
On June 19th, 2013, the Court's Register of Actions reflects an Order Denying Vicki
Lynn Woodley's Motion to Intervene was entered, and an Order Granting Defendant's Motion
For Summary Judgment, by the Honorable District Court Judge Bradly S. Ford. On June 26th,
2013, the Court's register of actions reflects that the Plaintiff's case against the Defendant was
Dismissed, and Judgment was entered as to that effect in the record by the Honorable District
Court Judge Bradly S. Ford, and served upon all of the parties to the action by the Court, and the
case was closed pending clerk action.
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On July 29th, 2013, the Court's register of actions reflects that the Plaintiff filed with the
Third Judicial District Canyon County District Court Clerk's office the Plaintiffs Notice of
Appeal to this Court, as well as Cashier's Checks totaling S 1372.00 ($1063.00 For Clerk's Full
Record plus$ 200.00 to get the Canyon County Court transcriptionist working, and $109.00 for
Court fees). Moreover, the Plaintiff also served, by mail, a copy of the Plaintiff's Notice of
Appeal, upon that of the Defense's legal counsel. At this time, this brings this case to this Court,
the Idaho Supreme Court, for adjudication. For a more detailed review of the course of the
proceedings which are rather extensive, see this case's register of actions. which although not
entirely accurate nor correct, and which the Plaintiff hereby denotes, does not in any way really
tell the truth of the activities in this case and why certain hearings and events happened the way
that they did in the instant action, it does give a general overview and time line of the case.

III. Statement of Facts
The Plaintiff, Andrew Mefford-Stanger, was born prematurely at seven months, on
to John Stanger and Vicki Mefford (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiff's Ex. H, Ln (No Ln. #
available)), (R. Vol. 4, Plaintiff's Ex. Q, Pg. 705, Ln 5-6), on

in Pocatello, Idaho.

Plaintiff was diagnosed with hypoxic brain damage that occurred upon, and shortly after birth (R.
Vol. 5, Plaintiff's Ex. G, (No Ln or PG# Available). Plaintiff was admitted to the Bannock
Regional Medical Center, Pocatello, Idaho, at three months of age, and again at eight months for
apnea and severe reflux. Plaintiff was placed on a heart monitor for apnea for the first year of his
life (R. Vol. 4, Plaintiff's Ex. Q, Pg. 705, Ln 22).
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John Stanger (the Defendant) had a mental breakdown in 1988, shortly after his son's
birth, and was admitted, by his Parents, Richard and Billie Stanger, to State Hospital South in
Blackfoot, Idaho (R. Vol. 4., Pg. 700, Ln l 0- I 4 ). Due to the Plaintiffs physical health, the
Plaintiff, and his Mother, moved to Nampa, Idaho, to live with his maternal Grandparents, until
the Plaintiffs health stabilized. The Plaintiff continued showing additional neurological
limitations by the age of two years, in relation to eye-hand coordination, dexterity, and/or
picking up blocks (R. Vol. 4, Pg. 705, Ln. 28).
The Defendant came back into the Plaintiffs life at 3 ½ years of age on May 11th, 1991
(R Vol. 4., Pg. 700, Ln 23). The Defendant and Vicki Mefford were married on October 10,
1992, in Boise, Ada, Idaho (R. Vol. 4, Plaintiffs Ex. 0, Pg. 694, Ln. 28). Defendant had a
nervous breakdown, and was admitted to the V.A. Mental Health Unit at Boise, Idaho in the
Spring of 1993 (R. Vol. 4, Plaintiffs Ex. 0, Pg. 695, Ln. I 0).
The Stanger Family moved to Pocatello, Bannock, Idaho, in the Summer of 1994,R. Vol.
4, Plaintiffs Ex. 0, Pg. 695, Ln 15), where the Plaintiff started First Grade at the age of 6 years
(R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. E. Pg. I, Ln 14). Plaintiff was evaluated, and placed on an Individual
Education Program (IEP), under the Individuals' with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), in
Second Grade (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. E, Pg. 1, Ln 14). Even though the Plaintiff was placed
in an Individual Education Program, (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. E, Ln. 1) there were only modest
improvements in some areas of functionality, but none in other areas that have been permanently
and irreparably damaged (R. Vol. 1, Pg. 6, Ln. 7 ). In Second Grade, Plaintiff was diagnosed
with hand tremors, and difficulties staying on track by a Physical Therapist provided by the

RE-DONE INITIAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF

PAGE# 22

Pocatello, Idaho School District (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiff's Ex. E., Pg. 7, Ln 11). By Third Grade,
Plaintiffs symptoms increased to include difficulty transferring visual information from one
location to another, and short-term memory difficulties. (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiff's Ex. E, Pg. 12, Ln.
6).

The Stanger Family moved back to Nampa, Idaho in August 1997, and Plaintiff was
introduced to his Fourth year of school at Greenhurst Elementary (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. E,
Pg. 29, Ln. 2). At the beginning of Plaintiff's 5th Grade of school, he began showing increased
social and physical difficulties, including stress- related headaches, bloody noses, seizures,
vertigo, and blackouts (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. Fl-12, Pg. 2, Ln. J). The Plaintiff was removed
from the Public School System in his 6th Grade, and home schooled for the next three years (R.
Vol. 4, Plaintiff's Ex.Q, Pg. 707, and Ln. 7), (R. Vol. 5, Pg2, Ln 26).
In 2006, and at the age of sixteen years, (R. Vol. 2, Plaintiffs Ex. D, Pg. 167, Ln. 18),
the Plaintiff, Plaintiffs Mother and Defendant agreed that if Plaintiff completed the GED
program to obtain his General Education Degree, that he would earn a vehicle from the
Defendant (R. Vol. 1, Pg. 7, Ln 3 -20), (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. D, Ln (No Line Number)), (R.
Vol. 4, Plaintiffs Ex. Q, Pg. 707, Ln. 7).
On March 30th, 2006, Vicki and John Stanger went through a Divorce. The Defendant
was Court- ordered to provide Child Support for the Plaintiff, as a minor. (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs'
Ex. A, Pg. 3, Ln 6-14). Child Support was to have started on the April 20, 2006 (R. Vol. 5,
Plaintiffs Ex. A, Pg. 3, Ln. 14), and continue through post-majority, especially for a child who
is still pursuing a high school education. The Plaintiff was enrolled in the General Equivalency
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Degree (GED) Program through Boise State University - Adult Basic Education Canyon County
Campus, Nampa, Idaho, in 2004, and completed testing on April I l, 2008 at the age of20 years.
(R. Vol. 1, Pg. 6, Ln 19). A General Equivalency Degree exemplifies an academic knowledge
equivalent to a recent high school graduate (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. D, Pg. 1). The Plaintiff
completed the GED Program four years later at the age of 20 years. Special accommodations
were made through Boise State University Adult Basic Education Department to allow for
extended time needed to complete tests (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. I), as well the use of a
calculator to assist with the Math portion of the GED (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. D).
The Defendant, a Veteran with a 100% Service Connected Disability, privately agreed at
the time of the 2006 Divorce case to provide post-secondary education support for Plaintiff
beyond the age oflegal majority via Veterans Education Benefits for Spouse and Children (R.
Vol. 4, Pg. 667, Ln. 10-14), and beyond. Additional benefits that were available to dependents
of a Veteran include post-secondary education, medical, recreational, and other benefits. It is
these Veterans Dependent benefits that were open to the Plaintiff pre and post-majority, among
other private benefits privately provided by the Defendant, as a Father to his son. (R. Vol. 1, Pg.
8, Ln 3-7), (R. Vol. 2, Pg. 169, Line 3-7), (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. Fl 12 #4, Ln 10-13), (R.
Vol. 1, Pg. 170, Ln. 1-6), (R., Vol. 2, Pg. 9, Ln. 1-5), (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex., Fl-12 # 8). (R.
Vol. 4, Pg. 667, Ln. 3 -25).
On May 22, 2008, the Plaintiff was medically diagnosed with a major depressive
disorder, and was briefly voluntarily admitted to a mental health unit on a mental health hold due
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to suicidal-ideations, in relation to a major depressive disorder (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. J. Pg. I,
Ln 8). The depressive disorder is still present in the Plaintiffs life.
Plaintiff supported the Defendant for temporary monetary support around October 2010,
as the Plaintiffs Mother was unemployed and unable to provide monetary support. The
Defendant willingly obliged the Plaintiff in this endeavor, and agreed to cover the Plaintiffs
living, medical and miscellaneous expenses. However, this, per the Defendant, was not to be
considered as child support, and that the money was considered as gifts, as a token of the
Defendant's love for his son. These amounts ended in February 2011, for the grant total of
$6,555.00 as a gift from the Defendant to the Plaintiff, as the Defendant's son (R. Vol.5, Pg. 758,
Lns 14-24). (R. Vol.4, Pg. 686-687, Lens 1-27, Lns 1-24).
Plaintiff was found, in 2011, through a Review performed by Social Security
Administration, Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, to have ongoing multiple
diagnosis of social affective disorder, panic disorder, organic mental disorder, and social anxiety
disorder (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. G, Pg. 7, Ln. 13, #3). Plaintiff also exhibited increased
memory loss, poor verbal functioning skills, and information processing. Plaintiff was noted to
have Hypoxic brain damage at birth (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. G, Pg. 8, Ln. 42). The Plaintiff
was ruled as not employable due to his disabilities (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. G).
Defendant legally acknowledges that he is the Plaintiffs birth Father (R. Vol.5,
Plaintiffs Ex. H, Pg.I, Ln. 14). Defendant stated that he had the duty of providing support to
Plaintiff. There was no age limit placed on this understanding between Father and son (R. Vol.
5, Plaintiffs Ex. A), (R. Vol. 2, Pg. 172, Ln 19-22), (R. Vol. 1, Pg. 11, Ln 19-22). The Plaintiff
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alleges that the Defendant has been negligent in providing the child support which was ordered,
as well as the post-secondary educational support that the Defendant had access to through the
U.S. Army (Veteran's Administration) Dependents Education Benefits (R. Vol. I, Ex. A, Pg. 8,
Ln I 0, Pg. 8, Ln.3).
There are bonds between a parent and a child. There is the parental relationship, duty,
and responsibility of a Father to be responsible for a disabled child (R. Vol. 3, Pg. 390, Ln 1-28,
Pg. 391, Ln. 1-23, Pg. 392, Ln. I). Other individuals entering into a parent-child relationship can
put a strain on that relationship. This action has taken place with the Court appointing a
Conservator, and Guardian for the Defendant without Plaintiffs notification of such action. This
action needs to be addressed. (R. Vol.4, Pg. 654. Ln 25-29, Pg. 655, Ln 1-4, Pg. 669, Ln 28, Pg.
670, Ln 1-14).
At this time, the Plaintiff knows of no known facts which are stipulated between himself
and the Defense, other than the Defendant is disabled and currently mentally ill and owes, at a
minimum, one month of past due Child Support. Thus, the Plaintiff hereby expressly reserves
the right to amend or alter these facts as they come forward, and come to be known during the
potential mediation or other Court proceedings. (R, Vol. 5, Pg. 760, Ln 15- 20).
FACTS OF THE CASE AFTER FILING
The District Court Case No. CVOC-2012-14406, was filed on August 14, 20 l 2, in the
Fomih Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, by Andrew B.
Mefford-Stanger, Pro-Se, (Plaintiff) vs John D. Stanger (Defendant). The Initial Court Case was
held on October 25th, 2012, before the Honorable Melissa Moody, Court Judge, (in lieu of
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Honorable Ronald Wilper, District Court Judge

Motion Hearing on October 25, 2012) (TR.

Vol. l, Pg. 3, Ln. 16). In this hearing, the question was posed to the basic fact that the Court
case for Guardianship was not opened until October 5th, 2012, after the Plaintiff had filed a Civil
Complaint on August 14, 2012, and amended the same on August 28, 2012, and submitted to the
Defendant. At the time of service, the Defendant had not been adjudicated as incompetent, thus
the Defendant was ruled as "eligible for service" (TR. Vol. I, Pg. 3, Ln 15).
The venue for child support was brought up by the Defendant's Attorney, Mr. James
Kaufman, in regards to the venue of this Case for child support reasons. The Plaintiff brought up
a prior Supreme Court Ruling, which in error, required the case under the 2011 version of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedures to go back to the original jurisdiction (TR. Vol. 1, Pg. 17, Ln.
13-19), that had been corrected by an later 2011-2012 order of this Court amending the rule to
correct the error. The Motion to Seal both the initial civil complaint, and the amended civil
complaint was addressed, and placed on hold (on the sealing of such) by the Honorable Judge
Melissa Moody. Judge Moody decided to not rule on the sealing at this time, re: "mental health
commitment case records of Plaintiff', and would be "inclined to grant the Motion to Seal the
mental commitment case records''(R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. J, Ln (No Line Number available as
this refers to a whole document in the record)), if they were in front of her. (TR. Vol. 1, Pg. 11,
3-14).
Plaintiff was given the option to redact portions of the hearing that Plaintiff did not want
the public to see. The Motion to Seal was put on hold by Judge Melissa Moody. A Civil
complaint regarding the sealing of documents was offered on August 14th, 2012, and an
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Amended Complaint was submitted on August 28th, 2012 shortly thereafter. Both documents
were placed on hold until the Court rules on such (TR. Vol. 1, Pg. 20, and Ln. 10-17). The case
entered default status on September 17th, 2012, and the Notice oflntent to take that Default was
sent on September 19th, 2012 to the Legal Counsel for the Defense, (R. Vol. 3, Pg. 378, Ln. (no
line number available, as this references multiple document pages from the record)), as well as
filed by fax with the Court on September 19th, 2012 (R. Vol. 3, Pg. 376-380, Ln. (no line
number available, as this references an entire two separate documents from the record)).
On December 3rd, 2012, Case (CVOC-2012-12106C), regarding Change of Venue was
discussed with Plaintiff (via telephone) vs. John Stanger (Defendant), Defendant's Legal
Representation, and the Guarantor of the Defendant. Fourth Judicial District Honorable Court
Judge Ronald J. Wilper presided (TR. Vol. 2, Pg. I, and Ln. 16). Decision for Change of Venue
was based on location of original Divorce Case in Canyon County. Change of Venue order was
requested. Jurisdiction was transferred to Canyon County Third Judicial District Court per Judge
Wilper's order (TR. Vol. 2, Pg. 14, Ln. 19). Substitution of Parties: Plaintiff requested to
substitute the Primary Defendant, Mr. John Stanger, to that of the Guardian and Conservator,
thus insuring that the case is pursued in the proper manner, and according to those parties of
interest. This substitution has taken place (R. Vol. 4, Pg. 543-544, Ln.21, and Ln. 1-3 on Pg.
544).
Plaintiff requested in Court for the Conservator and Guardian to provide documentation
that the Defendant has been ruled incapacitated (TR. Vol. 3, Pg. 7, Ln. 16-22 ), (R. Vol. 4, Pg.
544, Ln. 7-8). Plaintiff requested in Court that the Conservator and Guardian provide
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documentation to the Plaintiff, as to why the Defendant has not paid the child support owing (R.
Vol.5, Plaintiffs Ex. A, Pg. 3, Ln. 13-14), (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiff's Ex. D., Pg. 3, and Ln. 11).
Plaintiff requested, nor has there been signed, documents providing for continued health care
for the Plaintiff, who is the child of this order, in this case (TR. Vol.3, Pg. 7, Ln. 25, Ln. Pg. 8,
Ln. 1-8). Plaintiff filed a Motion for Affidavit for Non-Summary Contempt on January 18, 2013,
requesting to possibly hold the Primaiy Defendant, Mr. John Darwin Stanger, in contempt for
that issue, if he cannot show good issue for not doing so (TR. Vol. 3, Pg. 8, Ln. 8 -13), (R. Vol.
5, Plaintiffs Ex. A, Pg. 3, Ln 1-15.), (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiff's Ex. A, Supplemental Order, Pg.2,
Lns. 25-25.), (R. Vol. 3, Pg. 518, Lns 18-24, Pg. 519, Lns 25-26).
On March 7th, 2013, the Case was transferred to the Third Judicial District Court of the
State of Idaho, Canyon County, for a Motion Hearing and was heard by Honorable District Court
Judge Bradley S. Ford (TR. Vol. 3, Pg. 4, and Ln. 16). The Plaintiff brought to the Court for
consideration the Plaintiff's Motion for Substitution of Parties, Motion for Non-Summary
Contempt, Plaintiffs Motion for Default, and Objection to Trial Settings (TR. Vol.3, Pg. 7,
Lns.10-25, Pg. 8, Lns. 1-13). (TR. Vol. 3, Pg. 8, Lns 4-8), (R. Vol. 4, Pg. 543, Lns 24-24, Pg.
544, Lns 1-3). The Plaintiff brought the request to have the guardian and conservator substituted
in the place if the Defendant, due to his incapacity. (R. Vol. 5. Plaintiffs Ex. A, Pg. 3, Lns 114). Additionally, a request was made that the Conservator and Guardian, due the Defendants'
incapacitation, to show why he has not paid the child support that was due, and why there been
no signature forthcoming on any needed document for continuing health care for the Plaintiff
(R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. D), (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. A, Pg. 4, Ln. 15 - 34). On April 11th,
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2013, the Case was heard in the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Idaho, Canyon
County, for a Motion Hearing and was heard by Honorable District Court Judge Bradley S. Ford
(TR. Vol. 3, Pg. 30, Ln. 15).
At this time, the Plaintiff knows of no other known facts which are otherwise here
applicable other than these listed herein, but does hereby explicitly reserve the right to addend
them as they otherwise become known, and hereby denotes that all other facts, other than those
listed as being stipulated between each side hereto, are in full dispute.

IV. Abstraction of the case to this point in time
This case is a case that deals with multiple, intertwining, and extremely complex issues,
but primarily, in abstraction, is simply a case that deals with the fact that a mentally disabled
child was born to parents, whom later divorced, one of whom is the Father, whom is also
mentally disabled, mentally ill, and a Veteran. During that said Divorce, child support was
ordered for the Plaintiff, as a minor child, but never paid by the Father, whom is the obligor of
the order. Furthermore, law says that due to the Plaintiff's disability pre-majority, that such child
support continues on post majority, save for certain life events. Further, while the obligor wants
the Plaintiff to have the said support from him, and to fulfill his agreements and duties as a
Father. He is now unable to do so due to the mental illness, and its spawned delusions, which
also cause him to incorrectly believe that he controlled the Court during the Divorce, and that the
Court had to obtain permission from him prior to ordering child support, which have caused
many issues, including in some ways, this instant case.
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Furthennore, the Father is now legally, although still done by illegal process adjudicated
as being incapacitated, and cannot legally sign any documents required of him, including a
Private support agreement, as well as forms by the US Department of Veterans Affairs, Defense
Department, that are needed by the Plaintiff for their required purposes by those same agencies,
or otherwise. Additionally, the appointed legal guardian or conservator whom will not sign for
him, as their job entails, nor follow his wishes as to the support of his child. Moreover, are also
now interfering with agreements made prior to the Divorce, as well as prior to his incapacitation,
as well as God given rights as a Father to supp011, and bring up his son. As well as interfering
with the Plaintiffs relationship with his Father. See generally the United States Supreme Court
case of MEYER v. STATE OF NEBRASKA, among many others. 2.

V. Abstraction of the Appeal
This appeal, in abstraction, is an appeal that attempts to correct numerous legal and
factual errors made by the Defendant's legal counsel as well as the Court below, in the instant
action, as well as the lower Court's granting of the Defendant's legal counsel's Motion for
Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff, which caused an inappropriate, incorrect, and illegal
judgment to be rendered against the Plaintiff, in clear violation of law, fact, evidence, and
general every day common sense.

2

MEYER v. STATE OF NEBRASKA 262 U.S. 390 (1923) 262 U.S. 390, 399, at 399; Lassiter
v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L Ed. 2d 640
(1981 ); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 128, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (l 996);Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (l 982);Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645,651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972),
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3) Standards of Review
As a preliminary matter, the Plaintiff notes the following standards of review:

I. Summary Judgment
In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the
same as the standard used by the District Court in ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment.
See Fann Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, among many others 3. Further, as this Court has
reiterated in many cases, all disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in
favor of the non-moving party. See Bonz v. Sudweeks, among many others4 •
If the Court determines reasonable people could reach different conclusions, or draw
conflicting inferences from the record, evidence, and facts, summary judgment is not available,
and the motion must be denied. See Harris v. Department of Health & Welfare, among others 5 •
Furthermore, the burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all times upon
the moving party. See Tingley v. Harrison, as well as others 6 . To meet this burden, the moving

3

Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,272,869 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994);
East Lizard Butte Water Corp. v. Howell, 122 Idaho 679,681,837 P.2d 805,807 (1992); Eagle
Water Company, Inc. v. Roundy Pole Fence Company, Inc., 134 Idaho 626, 7 P.3d 1103 (2000).
4 Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,541,808 P.2d 876,878 (1991); G & M Farms v. Funk
Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,808 P.2d 851 (1991); Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118
Idaho 830,801 P.2d 37 (1990); Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987);
Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986); Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658,
651 P.2d 923 (1982); Kline v. Clinton, I 03 Idaho 116, 645 P.2d 350 (1982).
5 Harris v. Department of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992);
Puckett v. Oakfabco, Inc., 132 Idaho 816, 820, 979 P .2d 1174, 1178 (1999).
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party must "challenge in its motion and establish through evidence the absence of any genuine
issue of material fact on an element of the nonmoving party's case." See Smith v. Meridian Joint
Sch. Dist. No. 2 7 . This burden is onerous because even "[ c]ircumstantial evidence can create a
genuine issue of material fact." See Doe v. Durtschi, as well as others 8.
Additionally, ''if the moving party fails to challenge an element [of the non-moving
patty's claim] or fails to present evidence establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact on that element [of the non-moving party's claim], the burden does not shift to the
nonmoving party, and the non-moving party is not required to respond with supporting
evidence." See Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 7 . Moreover, this Court held that the
party responding to a summary judgment motion is not required to present evidence on every
element of his or her case at that time, but rather must establish a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the element or elements challenged by the moving party's motion. See Farm Credit
Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson 3 . However, if thereafter the above mentioned burden of
production has been properly shifted to the non-moving party, and the non-moving party fails to
provide a sufficient showing to establish the essential elements of the non-moving party's case.
In addition, if such is properly challenged by the moving party, then judgment shall only be

6

Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994). Also G & M Farms v. Funk
Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 ( 1991 ); Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92
Idaho 865, 868-69, 452 P.2d 362, 365-66 (1969); Christiansen v. Rumsey, 91 Idaho 684,429
P.2d 416 (1967); also Celotex v. Catrett, at 323 and in general.
7 Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714,719,918 P.2d 583,588 (1996).
8 Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,716 P.2d 1238 (1986); Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co.,
92 Idaho 865, 868-69, 452 P.2d 362, 365-66 (1969).
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granted to the moving party, with great caution and care by the Com1. If "the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, also show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact[,] and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter oflaw." See McCoy v. Lyons, as well as others 9. In general, in reviewing summary
judgment orders, "[t]his Court exercises free review over the entire record ... to determine
whether either side was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and reviews the inferences drawn
by the District judge to determine whether the record reasonably supports those inferences." See
lntennountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana Pac. Corp. 10 • Further, if there is no genuine issue
of material fact, only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review. See
Post v. Idaho Farmway, Inc. 11 •

II. Questions of Law
Moreover, a question of law is reviewed under the standard of free review. See Clark v.
St. Paul Property & Liability Ins. Co., among others 12 .

McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991 ); as well as see Atwood v.
Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 113, 138 P.3d 310, 313 (2006); and Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No.
2, 128 Idaho 714,719,918 P.2d 583,588 (1996)7; and Celotex v. Catrett, at 323,328 and in
fteneral.
0 lntermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 236, 31 P.3d 921,
924 (2001 ).
11 Post v. Idaho Farmway, Inc., 135 Idaho 475, 20 P.3d 11 (2001).
12 Clark v. St. Paul Property & Liability Ins. Co., 102 Idaho 756, 639 P.2d 454 (198 I); Harding
v. Home Investment & Sav. Co., 49 Idaho 64, 286 P. 920 (1930).
9
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III. Court Rule
Moreover, some of the issues herein require the interpretation of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, which is a matter of law, and is one over which this Court exercises free review.
Canyon County Bd. of Equalization v. Amalgamated Sugar Co. 13 . The Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding." See I.R.C.P. l(a), as well as others 14 •

IV. Attorney Fees, Costs And Sanctions
An award of attorney fees pursuant to section 12-121 of the Idaho Code is discretionary
and is subject to review and vacation only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. See Zaleha
v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, Chtd., and others 15 • In addition, this Court applies the abuse of
discretion standard to review issues of costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d) (1 ). See Vaught v. Dairyland
Ins. Co., and others 16 • In addition, in reviewing the award of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 (a) (1)
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court uses an abuse of discretion standard. See Sun
Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power 17 .

13

Canyon County Bd. of Equalization v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 143 Idaho 58, 60, 137 P.3d
445,447 (2006).
14 See I.R.C.P. l(a); Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 878, 136 P.3d 338,349 (2006).
15 Zaleha v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, Chtd., 131 Idaho 254,257,953 P.2d 1363, 1366
(1998); Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users Ass'n v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237,250, 869 P.2d 554,
567 (1993).
16 Vaught v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 131 Idaho 357, 956 P.2d 674 (1998); Adams v. Krueger, 124
Idaho 74, 77, 856 P.2d 864, 867 (1993).
17 Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. ldaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).
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V. Abuse of Discretion
In reviewing for a potential abuse of discretion by a lower Court, this Court must
consider "(I) whether the trial Court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion [. ], (2)
whether the trial Court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it. [a]nd (3) whether the trial
Court reached its decision by an exercise ofreason."' Zaleha at 1366, 1518 .

VI. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law over which this Court has free review. See
Chapple v. Madison County Officials 19 •

VII. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action
The standard for reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 12(b) (6) is the same as the standard upon the grant of a motion for summary judgment.
The non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record and pleadings viewed in
his/her favor, and only then may the question be asked whether a claim for relief has been stated.
Miles v. Idaho Power20 .

VIII. Constitutional Interpretation
In preforming constitutional interpretations, the standard that this Court exercises, is a
standard of free review, interpretation and construction of the Idaho Constitution. See State v.
18

Zaleha, 131 Idaho at 257, 953 P.2d at 1366 (quoting Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power
Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 ( 1991 ), Punctuation and grammar changes for
readability mine).19 Chapple v. Madison County Officials, 132 Idaho 76, 78, 967 P.2d 278, 280 (1998).
20 Miles v. Idaho Power, 116 ldaho 635,637, 778 P.2d 757, 759 (1989).
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O'N eill 21 . Both constitutional questions and questions of statutory interpretation are questions of
law over which this Court exercises free review. Federated Publ'ns, Inc. v. Idaho Bus. Rev.,
Inc. 22 • Moreover, this Court stated the following on the interpretation and construction of the
Idaho Constitution, and the standard of review used: "We note at the outset that ['][t]he general rules of statutory construction apply to
constitutional provisions generally.['] Westerberg v. Andrus, 114 Idaho 401,403,
757 P.2d 664, 666 (1988); Engelking v. Investment Board, 93 Idaho 217,221,458
P .2d 213, 217 ( 1969) ([' ][T]he general rules of statutory construction apply to the
amendment of a constitution as well as to constitutional provisions generally[']);
Lewis v. Woodall, 72 Idaho 16, 18,236 P.2d 91, 93 (1951) (['][T]he statutory
rules of construction apply to the interpretation of constitutional provisions[']);
Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423,437, 195 P.2d 662,670 (1948) ([')[G)eneral
principles of statutory construction apply to the interpretation of constitutions[']);
Higer v. Hansen, 6 7 Idaho 45, 52, 170 P.2d 411, 415 (1946) ([']The same rules
apply to the construction of provisions of the Constitution as apply to construction
of statutes[']); Phipps v. Boise St. Car Co., 61 Idaho 740, 747, 107 P.2d 148, 151
(1940) ([']The general provisions of statutory construction apply to the
interpretation of constitutions.[']). When called upon to review legislation, this
Court has stated:
[']The most fundamental premise underlying judicial review ... is that,
unless the result is palpably absurd, the courts must assume the legislature
meant what it said. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect. ['] State, Dept. of Law Enforcement v. One 1955 Willys Jeep, 100 Idaho 150, 153,
595 P.2d 299, 302 (1979). Where a statute or constitutional provision is clear we
must follow the law as written. Moses v. State Tax Com'n, 118 Idaho 676, 799
P.2d 964 (1990); State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho 1, 704 P.2d 333 (1985); Herndon v.
West, 87 Idaho 335,393 P.2d 35 (1964); John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Neill, 79 Idaho 385, 319 P.2d 195 (1957). Where the language is unambiguous,
there is no occasion for the application of rules of construction. Airstream, Inc. v.
21

State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245, 796 P.2d 121, 122 (1990).
Federated Publ'ns, Inc. v. Idaho Bus. Rev., Inc., 146 ldaho 207,210, 192 P.3d 1031, 1034
(2008). See also Sweeney v. Otter, 804 P.2d 308, 119 Idaho 135 (1990), at 311-312.
22
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CIT Financial Serv., Inc., I 11 Idaho 307, 723 P.2d 851 ( 1986); Ottesen v. Board of
Com'rs of Madison County, 107 Idaho 1099, 695 P.2d 1238 (1985); Worley
Highway Dist. v. Kootenai County, 98 Idaho 925, 576 P.2d 206 ( 1978).
We note the venerable words of Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 185, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824) as he spoke about constitutional
interpretation and construction:
[']As men whose intentions require no concealment, generally employ the
words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey,
the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who
adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense,
and to have intended what they have said. If, from the imperfection of human
language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given
power, it is a well settled rule that the objects for which it was given,
especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should
have great influence in the present case. We know of no reason for excluding
this rule from the present case. ['] - Id., 22 U.S. at 188-189.
The fundamental object in construing constitutional provisions is to ascertain the
intent of the drafters by reading the words as written, employing their natural and
ordinary meaning, and construing them to fulfill the intent of the drafters. Haile v.
Foote, 90 Idaho 261,409 P.2d 409 (1965); Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195
P.2d 662 (1948)." (Sweeney v. Otter, 804 P.2d 308, 119 Idaho 135 (1990), Id at
311-312, singling of quotation marks mine)

IX. Issues Raised First Upon Appeal
Ordinarily, issues not raised below and presented for the first time on appeal will not be
considered or reviewed. See Sandpoint Convalescent Serv., Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Health and
Welfare 23 • However, see also State v. Fudge 24, where this Court, in declaring its standard of
review there, stated the following on this issue: -

Sandpoint Convalescent Serv., Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Health and Welfare, 114 Idaho 281,284,
756 P.2d 398,401 (1988); cf. Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 351, 787 P.2d 1159 (1990).
24 State v. Fodge, 824 P.2d 123, 121 Idaho 192 (1992), at 126 - 127.
23
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"Instead, appellant raised the constitutional issue for the first time in his brief to
this Court. Our rule is clear: ['] The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will
not consider issues that are presented for the first time on appeal. ['] Sanchez v.
Arrive, 120 Idaho 321,322,815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991). The exception to this rule
is that ['][ c]onstitutional issues may be considered for the first time on appeal if
such consideration is necessary for subsequent proceedings in the case. I.C. § 1205.['] Sanchez, 120 Idaho at 322, 815 P.2d at 1062, quoting Messmer v. Ker, 96
Idaho 75, 78, 524 P.2d 536, 539 (1974). Since there are no subsequent proceedings
in this case, the exception does not apply, and the longstanding rule prohibits this
Court from deciding this issue." - (Singling of quotation marks mine) Further, see also Sanchez v. Arave 25 , that also discussed this issue: "The majority opinion is also mistaken in its assertion that issues of
constitutionality cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. While ordinarily this
Court will not consider issues that were not raised in the trial Court, it will address
issues raised for the first time on appeal concerning jurisdiction, failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, and constitutionality. Nycum v. Triangle
Dairy Co., 109 Idaho 858,862,712 P.2d 559,562 (1985); see also Cole v.
Fruitland Canning Co., 64 Idaho 505, 5 I 0, 134 P.2d 603, 605 (1943)
(constitutional question reached though issue was raised for first time on appeal)."
See also State v. Mauro 26, where this Court at 111 denoted the following:
"The Court of Appeals correctly acknowledged that issues not raised in the trial
Court cannot be later raised on appeal, under our case of State v. Martin, supra,
and also that [']fundamental errors['] may be raised for the first time on appeal.
State v. White, 97 Idaho 708,551 P.2d 1344 (1976); State v. Grob, 107 Idaho 496,
690 P.2d 951 (Ct.App. 1984). However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that there was any [']fundamental error['] in the trial Court's
acceptance of Mauro's guilty plea.
Fundamental error has been defined to mean an error [']which so profoundly
distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his
constitutional right to due process.[']State v. Morris, 116 Idaho 834, 836, 780 P.2d
156, 158 (Ct.App. 1989) ( citing State v. Koch, 115 Idaho 176, 765 P.2d 687
25

26

Sanchez v. Arave, 815 P.2d 1061, 120 Idaho 321 (l 99l)(Justice Bistline's dissent), at 1063.
State v. Mauro, 824 P.2d 109, 121 Idaho 178 (1991 ), at 111.
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(Ct.App. 1988)). Thus, to determine whether fundamental error occun-ed in this
case, we must determine if Mauro was deprived of his constitutional right to due
process." (Id at 111, singling of quotation marks mine) -

X. Questions of Fact
On appeal, the reviewing Court will not disturb the District Court's factual findings if supported
by substantial and competent evidence. See Evangelical Lutheran Good Sam. Soc. v. Board of
Equalization of Latah County, as well as others 27 . However, this Court is not bound by the legal
conclusions of the District Court and is free to draw its own conclusion from the facts presented.
See Clark v. St. Paul Property & Liab. Ins. Cos. 28 .

XI. Existence of a Duty
The existence of a duty is a question of law over which this Court may exercise free
review. Summers v. Cambridge Joint Sch. Dist. No. 432 29 .

XII. Statutory Interpretation
Furthermore, the resolution of some of the issues herein involves the interpretation of a
statute, which is a question of law, and is to be reviewed de novo. See V-1 Oil Co. v. Idaho State
Tax Comm'n, as well as others 30 . This Court has free review over the construction of a statute,

27

Evangelical Lutheran Good Sam. Soc. v. Board of Equalization of Latah County, 119 Idaho
126,127,804 P.2d 299,300 (1991). See also I.R.C.P. 52(a); Cougar Bay Co. Inc. v. Bristol,
l 00 Idaho 380, 597 P.2d l 070 (1979); Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d 627
(1973).
28 Clark v. St. Paul Property & Liab. Ins. Cos., 102 Idaho 756,757,639 P.2d 454,455 (1981).
29 Summers v. Cambridge Joint Sch. Dist. No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 955, 88 P.3d 772, 774 (2004).
30 V-1 Oil Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 134 Idaho 716, 718, 9 P.3d 519,521 (2000); Thomas
v. Worthington, 132 Idaho 825,828,979 P.2d 1183, 1186 (1999).
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Waters Garbage v. Shoshone Count/ 1, which includes whether a statute provides for judicial
review, and the standard of review to be applied if judicial review is available. This Court has
free review over subject matter jurisdiction issues. See Chapple v. Madison County Officials 19 •
This Court's standard ofreview for statutory interpretation is already well established, as shown
in Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't of Agric 32 :"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises
free review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850,852 (2001).
Interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal words.
State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214,219 (1999). Where the
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts give effect to the statute as
written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459,
462, 988 P.2d 685,688 (1999). Only where the language is ambiguous will this
Court look to rules of construction for guidance and consider the reasonableness of
proposed interpretations. Albee v. Judy, 136 Idaho 226,231, 31 P.3d 248,253
(2001)." (Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't of Agric., 143
Idaho 366,368, 146 P.3d 632,634 (2006), at 634)Further, see Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Ada County, and others 33 , ("Moreover, unless a contrary purpose is clearly indicated, ordinary
words will be given their ordinary meaning when construing a statute.") Moreover, Appellate
courts are obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality. See

31

Waters Garbage v. Shoshone County, 138 Idaho 648,650, 67 P.3d 1260, 1262 (2003)
Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't of Agric., 143 Idaho 366, 368, 146 P.3d
632, 634 (2006), at 634.
33 Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Ada County, 123
Idaho 410,418,849 P.2d 83, 91 (1993) at 88 (citing Bunt v. City of Garden City, 118 Idaho 427,
430, 797 P.2d 135, 138 ( 1990)). ("Moreover, unless a contrary purpose is clearly indicated,
ordinary words will be given their ordinary meaning when construing a statute.")
32
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State v. Newman 34 . Furthermore, in construing a statute, this Court will not deal in any subtle
refinements of the legislation, but will ascertain and give effect to the purpose and intent of the
legislature, based on the whole act and every word therein, lending substance and meaning to the
provisions. See George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger 35 . In construing a statute, the Court
may examine the language used, the reasonableness of proposed interpretations and the policy
behind the statute. See State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc. 36 .The starting point for any
statutory interpretation is the literal wording of the statute, and the Court will give the statute's
language its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. See Eastern Idaho Agricultural Credit Ass'n v.
Neibaur37 . Every word, clause, and sentence should be given effect, if possible. See Wright v.
Willer·38 . See also Nagel v. Hammond·'°9 :
"This Court has repeatedly stated that words and phrases of a statute must be given
theirusuaL plain, and ordinary meaning. J.C.§ 73-113. Words that are in common
use among the people should be given the same meaning in a statute as they have
among the great mass of people who are expected to read, obey and uphold them.
City of Lewiston v. Mathewson, 78 Idaho 347,354,303 P.2d 680,684 [( 1965)];
Striebeck v. Employment Security Agency, 83 Idaho 531,366 P.2d 589 [(1961)]."
-(Nagel v. Hammond, 90 Idaho 96, 100, 408 P.2d 468, 472 (1965), at 470) -

34

State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 13, n. 12,696 P.2d 856,864 n. 12 (1985).
George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387-88
(1990)
36 State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727,947 P.2d 400 (1997).
37 Eastern Idaho Agricultural Credit Ass'n v. Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402,987 P.2d 314 (1999)
38 Wright v. Willer, 111 Idaho 474, 725 P.2d 179 ( 1986); University of Utah Hosp. & Medical
Center v. Bethke, 101 Idaho 245, 611 P.2d 1030 (1980)
39 Nagel v. Hammond, 90 Idaho 96, 100,408 P.2d 468,472 (1965), at 470.
35
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Further, see Grazer v. Jones40 : "We decline to do violence to the plain language of LC. § 5-215 in the name of
uniformity. Unlike courts in some other states, we are not at liberty to depart from
the plain meaning of a statute for policy reasons. See Verska v. Saint Alphonsus
Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 896, 265 P.3d 502, 509 (2011 ). See generally John
F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, and 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2388 (2003)." (idat 192-193)-

11. Issues on Appeal
1) Did the District Court err in granting the Defendant(s) Motion for Summary
Judgment by allowing a moving party in a summary judgement proceading to shift
the burden of production to the non-moving party, only after making an alegation,
and pointing to an area of the record in the moving party's Motion for Summary
Judgement, but not actually providing aditional evidance, beyond what is allready
provided by the non-moving party. to back up their alegations?
2) Did the District Court err by introducing bias and subtitle discrimination into the
proceedings, cloaked in respectfulness, by claiming that because the Plaintiff did not
appear to have some physical manifestation of claimed disability, was intelligent,
articulate, and able to perform such: legal research, analysis, and writing for the
instant case, that the Plaintiff(s) did or could not have had such disability complained

40

Grazer v. Jones, 294 P.3d 184 (Idaho 2013).("We decline to do violence to the plain language
of LC. § 5-215 in the name of uniformity. Unlike courts in some other states, we are not at
liberty to depart from the plain meaning of a statute for policy reasons. See Verska v. Saint
Alphonsus Reg'I Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,896,265 P.3d 502,509 (2011). See generally John F.
Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2388 (2003).") (id at 192 -193) -
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of?
3) Attoney's Fees and Costs

III. Arguments
1) District Court erred by allowing the moving party in a
summary judgment proceeding to shift the burden of production
to the non-moving party only after making an allegation and
pointing to an area of the record in the moving party's motion for
summary judgment.
The Plaintiff will not waste this Court's time on this issue, as this Court has already said
multiple times, in previous appeals from summary judgment proceedings, that the District Court
has clearly erred time and time again, by not requiring additional evidence in addition to making
an allegation, and pointing to the record, which may contain evidence submitted by the nonmoving party, to prove the moving party's point. See Shelton v. Shelton 4 1, in which this Court
stated the following: -

"On a motion for summary judgment, '[t]he burden of proving the absence of
material facts is upon the moving party. Once the moving party establishes the
absence of a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that
a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged element of the claim does exist.
' Hei v. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 85, 73 P.3d 94, 98 (2003). '[I]f a party moving
for summary judgment raises issues in his motion but then fails to provide any
41

See Shelton v. Shelton, 148 Idaho 560, 564 n.4, 225 P.3d 693, 697 n.4 (2009), at 699.
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evidence showing a lack of any genuine issue of material fact with respect to
those issues, the nonmoving party has no burden to respond with supporting
evidence." Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,531,887 P.2d
1034, 1038 (1994)." For the Plaintiff contends that raising the issue, as noted above, simply means that all the
moving party has done, is make an allegation towards the non-moving party, and point to the
area in the record where that is stated, or is thought to be wrong. However, raising the issue does
not mean that the moving party has supplied additional evidence to prove their point. For this
Court to allow such things to occur, would be tantamount to allowing the moving party to be a
tattletale or a gossipmonger of sorts. As all a moving party would have to do then would be,
make a potentially baseless allegation and point to the record, to win every summary judgment
proceeding, without ever backing up their positions with additional evidence beyond what is
already on the record. E.g., He does not like red neckties as he claims, because he said he likes
blue ones in Ex. DW, memorandum, transcript, deposition, the proceedings, etc ....
Thus, as the Court can see by the above example, there is no proof that the person does
not like red neckties as submitted by the moving party, just an allegation. Perhaps who really
knows except maybe that same said man in the above example, as maybe he likes every other
color of necktie but red, and that is just it. Without this additional data from which to make a
properly informed decision, this, and any other Court makes a false decision, and therefore, an
incorrect result happens and causes i.e., that same said man to be put on death row, simply,
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because he stated that he liked blue neckties. See generally, Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist.
No. 242 , in which this Court stated: "The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125
Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 ( 1994). In order to meet its burden, the moving
pa11y must challenge in its motion and establish through evidence the absence of
any genuine issue of material fact on an element of the nonmoving party's case.
Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,530, 887 P.2d 1034, 1038
(1994).If the moving party fails to challenge an element or fails to present
evidence establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on that
element, the burden does not shift to the nonmoving party, and the non-moving
party is not required to respond with supporting evidence."
However, in continuing with Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No.

, this Court

further stated the following: "If the moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the
basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the
nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine
issue of fact. Tingley, 125 Idaho at 90, 867 P.2d at 964."
This is in contrast to the above quote from Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2 42 ,
and then is even further confusing when in that same case and same point, this Court seemingly
thereafter states the following: "Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party, when the
nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson, 126
Idaho at 530-31, 887 P.2d at 1037-38; Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765
P.2d 126, 127 ( 1988). The party opposing the summary judgment motion "may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific
42

See generally, Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, at 588, Supra Footnote
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facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e). If the nonmoving party does not come forward with evidence as provided in LR.C.P. 56(e),
then summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party. Id.;
State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 [daho 267,270, 899 P.2d 977, 980
( 1995). "
This, the Plaintiff argues, creates a double standard of sorts, as if, on the one hand, the
moving party fails to challenge an element, or fails to present evidence establishing the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact on that element, the burden does not shift to the nonmoving
party, and the non-moving party is not required to respond with supporting evidence. Yet, on the
other hand, if the moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Moreover, continues on
to state that the summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party, when the
nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case upon
which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. That the second choice seems to ignore or fails
to mention the fact that 43 :

-

"The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125
Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 ( 1994). [ and that i]n order to meet its burden, the
moving party must challenge in its motion and establish through evidence the
absence of any genuine issue of material fact on an element of the nonmoving
party's case. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,530, 887 P.2d
1034, 1038 (1994). If the moving party fails to challenge an element or fails to
present evidence establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on
that element, the burden does not shift to the nonmoving party, and the non-

43

See again, generally, Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2 at 588, supra 7 .
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moving party is not required to respond with supporting evidence." (Additions for
clarification and spelling flow mine).
Still exists, and thus, still applies, and that the burden of establishing the "absence," of a
genuine issue of material fact, still rests, at all times with the party moving for summary
judgment, even if the moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case, on the
basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Not just when the moving party fails to
challenge an element, or fails to present evidence establishing the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, on that element of the non-moving party's case, as it would seem to suggest. See
generally, the discussion below on this issue and other directly connected issues in Thomson v.
Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc. 44 , in which this Court stated: "Although the District Court ruled that there were disputed material factual issues
regarding the elements of duty and breach, the Court concluded that the Thomsons
had not shown sufficient material facts from which the Court could find a genuine
issue regarding the element of proximate causation. The Thomsons argue that the
District Court should not have granted summary judgment on the issue of
proximate causation because the respondents never raised this issue in their
motion. The Thomsons claim that the Court erred by misinterpreting the decisions
in Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, I 06 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), and
Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,765 P.2d 126 (1988). We agree.
The record in this case indicates that the only argument raised by the respondents
in their motion for summary judgment was that the Thomsons had allegedly failed
to raise disputed material factual issues with respect to the elements of duty and
breach. In fact, respondents averred in their reply memorandum on the summary
judgment motion that: 'This entire matter pivots upon a basic legal question: what
duty is properly imposed upon an insurance broker or agent when that agent
receives a request to increase an insured's coverage'. (Emphasis added). This Court
recently held that the party responding to a summary judgment motion is not
44

See generally, Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,887 P.2d 1034 (1994), at
1037 1038.
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required to present evidence on every element of his or her case at that time, but
rather must establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the element or
elements challenged by the moving party's motion. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane
v. Stevenson, 125 ldaho 270,273,869 P.2d 1365, 1368 (1994). Thus, with respect
to the present case, we hold that because the respondents did not raise the issue of
proximate causation in their motion and supporting evidentiary material, the
Thomsons were not required to address this element of negligence even though
they will ultimately have to prove it at trial.
Our holding is consistent with the decisions in Celotex, supra and Badell, supra.
Those cases stand for the principle that a moving party is entitled to summary
judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552;
Badell, 115 Idaho at 102, 765 P.2d at 127. In applying this principle to the present
case, then, respondents would have been entitled to summary judgment had the
Thomsons failed to make a showing that disputed material facts existed with
respect to the elements of duty and breach, since these are the elements of
negligence upon which the respondents moved. However, the District Court erred
by applying the Celotex and Badell doctrine to mean that when a party moves for
summary judgment on one issue, then the nonmoving party must respond as to all
issues and submit factual materials on all issues, even though those 'issues' have
not been asserted, because the nonmoving party (in this case the Thomsons), will
have the ultimate burden of proving every element of their case at trial. Pursuant to
our holding in Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, supra, if the movant
does not challenge an aspect of the nonmovant's case in that party's motion, the
nonmovant is not required to address it at the summary judgment stage of the
proceedings.
Our holding is also consistent with Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690, 838 P.2d
293 (1992), in which this Court was called upon to review the propriety of the
granting of summary judgment by the trial Court in an attorney malpractice case.
The defendant's attorney filed a summary judgment motion arguing, inter alia, that
there was no evidence that Pike breached the standard of practice for attorneys or
that Thompson suffered any actual damages as a result of the alleged malpractice.
In considering this issue, this Court stated:
Concerning the element of actual damages, with which Pike also joins the
element of proximate cause, Pike did not support her motion with any
evidence showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact that
Pike's alleged conduct was the proximate cause of any actual damages to
Thompson. In the absence of evidence supporting the motion as to these
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elements, Thompson had no burden to respond with evidence supporting
actual damages proximately caused by Pike's conduct.122 Idaho at 698;
838 P.2d at 301. (Emphasis added).
Thus, the principle enunciated in Thompson was that if a party moving for
summary judgment raises issues in his motion but then fails to provide any
evidence showing a lack of any genuine issue of material fact with respect to those
issues, the nonmoving party has no burden to respond with supporting evidence.
This Court has consistently held that when a party moves for summary judgment,
the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
rests with that party. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963
(1994) ( 'The burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all times
upon the moving party.'); See also Harris v. State, Dep't. of Health & Welfare, 123
Idaho 295,298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992); McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,
769,820 P.2d 360,364 (1991); G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho
514,517, 808 P.2d 851,854 (1991). Thus, it follows that if the moving party fails
to challenge an element of the nonmovant's case, the initial burden placed on the
moving party has not been met and therefore does not shift to the nonmovant. ln
the present case, not only was there no evidence showing a lack of proximate
cause, but no argument was even offered to the District Court on this element of
negligence by the respondents. The District Court improperly seized upon the
proximate cause issue sua sponte. The burden never shifted to the Thomsons to
provide evidence of proximate causation because the respondents never raised the
issue in the first place. Thus, we hold that the District Court erred in granting the
respondents' motion for summary judgment on the basis that the Fred Harris
affidavit was insufficient to establish proximate cause." - (Thomson v. Idaho Ins.
Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 887 P.2d l 034 (1994), id at 1037 1038) Furthermore, in Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist. the Idaho Appeals Court quoted
Martin B. Louis, in the Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis 45 , in its
holding that the respondents in that case properly carried their burden on their motion for

45

Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 876 P.2d 154 (Ct.App.1994), footnote 2.
Quoting Martin B. Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 Yale
L.J. 745, 750 (1974)("Such an absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative
showing with the moving party's own evidence or by a review of all the nonmoving party's
evidence and the contention that such proof of an element is lacking.")
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summary judgment, by the non-moving party's showing that it was unable to present sufficient
evidence. However, much like the Thomsons in Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc. 4644 , the
Plaintiff argues that the Idaho Appeals Court would have erred by reaching that conclusion after
Celotex v. Catrett47 , and Badell v. Beeks 48 had happened. By misinterpreting the decisions
therein, to mean that by a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence, and the contention that
such proof of an element is lacking by the moving party, is all that is required of to shift the
burden to the non-moving party in Idaho. Additionally, that this Court was, somewhat in part, in
error regarding its discussion in G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co. 49 , on Celotex v. Catrett : "Respondents urge that application of the principles first established by the United
States Supreme Comi in Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, l 06 S.Ct. 2548, 91
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), and thereafter adopted by this Court in Olsen v. J.A. Freeman
Co., 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990); Sparks v. St. Luke's Regional Medical
Center, Ltd., 115 Jdaho 505,768 P.2d 768 (1988); Dekkerv. Magic Valley
Regional Medical Center, 115 Idaho 332, 766 P.2d 1213 ( 1988); Badell v. Beeks,
I 15 Idaho 101, 765 P.2d 126 ( 1988), requires affirming the entry of partial
summary judgment. \Ve disagree. The principle established in Celotex and its
progeny simply establishes that the language of Rule 56 requires entry of
summary judgment after adequate time for discovery against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case and in which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 321-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53, 91
L.Ed.2d at 272-75. See also Olsen v. Freeman, 117 ldaho at 720-21, 791 P.2d
at 1299-300, and Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho at 102, 765 P.2d at 127. In
construing the evidence in the record most favorably to G & M Farms, and giving
it the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, there is
46

See Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc.(1994), supra44 .
47 See the United States Supreme Court case of Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548,
91 L. Ed.2d 265 (1986).
48 See Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 10 I, 765 P.2d 126 (1988)
49 G & M Farms v. Funk hTigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P .2d 851, 854 (1991 ), at 863
864.
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evidence to support each element of the prima facie case necessary for the theory
of intentional misrepresentation.
We therefore conclude that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding G & M
Farms' claim that Lindsay Manufacturing and DeKalb Agresearch, as Lindsay's
parent company, failed to disclose material information regarding the Generation II
lateral move irrigation system prior to the purchase of the system by G & M
Farms. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment granted against defendants
Lindsay Manufacturing and DeKalb Agresearch on this issue and remand for trial.
Although we hold that application of the clear and convincing evidence standard is
not required in these summary judgment proceedings, and continue to adhere to the
traditional Rule 56 standards, it must be kept in mind that the plaintiff must still
prove the claims and allegations of fraud and intentional misrepresentation at trial
by clear and convincing evidence. Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d
1022 (1987); Faw v. Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387,613 P.2d 1338 (1980); Smith v.
King, I00 Idaho 331, 597 P.2d 217 ( 1979); Gneiting v. Clement, 96 Idaho 348,
528 P.2d 1283 (1974)." -(G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., I 19 Idaho 514,
517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 ( 1991 ), at 863 864, Bolding Mine)
7

For while true, as this Court stated above, that the principle established in Celotex 4 , and
its progeny, simply establishes that the language of Rule 56 requires entry of summary judgment,
after adequate time for discovery, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and in which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial. This Court negated to mention, that First, this only happens after
the burden of production placed upon the moving party by the rules and law, has been properly
shifted to the non-moving party. Second, that while true, a party may move in two different ways
in regards to summary judgment motions, but both ways still require that the moving party meet
its burden of production, before any burden shifts to the non-moving party. Third, if the second
route is taken, and motion is made upon the grounds that the non-moving party has no evidence
to prove its case, then assertions by the moving party that it is so is not enough to shift the

RE-DONE INITIAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF

PAGE# 52

burden to the non-moving party. They must still also meet their burden of production to prove to
the Court that the truth that they assert really is the truth, not just what they want the truth to be.
Furthermore, as noted in Celotex v. Catrett47 , regarding summary judgment or Rule
56(c)5° procedure, which as the Idaho Court of Appeals in Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist. 51 ,
noted that the " ... Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), [ ... ]is identical in all relevant aspects to
I.R.C.P. 56(c)." Moreover, that "the language and reasoning of Celotex has been adopted by the
appellate courts of Idaho." 52 Thus, in continuing with Celotex v. Catrett53, and Justice White's
concurring statements therein, that concurred with Justice Rehnquist on the majority opinion and
therefore made it the plurality opinion of the case, as well as the controlling vote. Moreover,

50 In reference to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c), discussed in Celotex v.
· 47 .
C atrett, supra ab ove 111
51 Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872,876 P.2d 154 (Ct.App.1994), at 156 in
referencing Celotex v. Catrett, supra 47
52 See, e.g., G & M Fanns, supra49 ; Barab v. Plumleigh, 123 Idaho 890, 892, 853 P.2d 635,637
(Ct.App.1993); Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 937,941,854 P.2d 280,
284 (Ct.App.1993); Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 44-45, 844 P.2d 24, 26-27 (Ct.App.1992),
which were therein cited by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist.,
4~
supra·
.
53 Celotex v. Catrett, supra 47 , See Justice White's concurring statements at 328. that concurred
with Justice Rehnquist on the majority opinion and therefore made it the plurality opinion of the
case, as well as the controlling vote. Moreover, along with that of the majority, and therefore the
binding, opinion of the Court, is also made, under their holding in Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188, 193 (1977) at 193 -("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds."') -The controlling, but only persuasive authority while an concurring opinion ,
however, if applied under the Marks rule noted above, turns into the holding of the Court in that
of Celotex v. Catrett, supra 21.
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along with that of the majority, and therefore the binding, opinion of the Court, is also made,
under their holding in Marks v. United States 54 , herein after referred to as the Marks rule, of: "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds."' -(Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) at 193) Thus, while Justice White's opinion is only persuasive authority as concurring opinion in
and of itself, however, if the Marks rule is applied as noted above, it turns into the controlling
and overall holding of the Court in that of Celotex v. Catrett4 7 . Therefore, Justice White's
concurring statements therein, is hereby stated as the United States Supreme Court's controlling
and overall holding, in Celotex v. Catrett47 :

-

"I agree that the Court of Appeals was wrong in holding that the moving defendant
must always supp01i his motion with evidence or affidavits showing the absence of
a genuine dispute about a material fact. I also agree that the movant may rely on
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and the like, to demonstrate that the
plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case and hence that there can be no factual
dispute. But the movant must discharge the burden the Rules place upon him:
It is not enough to move for summary judgment without supporting the
motion in any way or with a conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no
evidence to prove his case.
A plaintiff need not initiate any discovery or reveal his witnesses or evidence
unless required to do so under the discovery rules or by Court order. Of
course, he must respond if required to do so; but he need not also depose his
witnesses or obtain their affidavits to defeat a summary judgment motion
asserting only that he has failed to produce any support for his case. It is the
defendant's task to negate, if he can, the claimed basis for the suit." (Emphasis mine)-

Further, as Justice Brennan stated in his dissenting opinion, in Celotex v. Catrett55 , that: 54

Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) at 193.
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"If the burden of persuasion at trial would be on the nonmoving party, the party
moving for summary judgment may satisfy Rule 56's burden of production in
either of two ways. First, the moving party may submit affirmative evidence that
negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. Second, the moving
party may demonstrate to the Court that the nonmoving party's evidence is
insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See
lOA Wright§ 2727, pp. 130-131; Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A
Critical Analysis, 83 Yale L. J. 745, 750 (1974) (hereinafter Louis). If the
nonmoving party cannot muster sufficient evidence to make out its claim, a trial
would be useless and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter
oflaw. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., ante, at 249.
Where the moving party adopts this second option and seeks summary judgment
on the ground that the nonmoving party - who will bear the burden of persuasion
at trial - has no evidence, the mechanics of discharging Rule 56's burden of
production are somewhat trickier. Plainly, a conclusory assertion that the
nonmoving party has no evidence is insufficient. See ante, at 328 (WHITE, J.,
concurring). Such a 'burden' of production is no burden at all and would simply
permit summary judgment procedure to be converted into a tool for harassment.
See Louis 750-751. Rather, as the Court confirms, a party who moves for summary
judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party has no evidence must
affirmatively show the absence of evidence in the record. Ante, at 323. This may
require the moving party to depose the nonmoving party's witnesses or to establish
the inadequacy of documentary evidence. If there is literally no evidence in the
record, the moving party may demonstrate this by reviewing for the Court the
admissions, interrogatories, and other exchanges between the parties that are in the
record. Either way, however, the moving party must affinnatively demonstrate that
there is no evidence in the record to support a judgment for the nonmoving party.

If the moving party has not fully discharged this initial burden of production, its
motion for summary judgment must be denied, and the Court need not consider
whether the moving party has met its ultimate burden of persuasion. Accordingly,
the nonmoving party may defeat a motion for summary judgment that asserts that
the nonmoving party has no evidence by calling the Court's attention to supporting
evidence already in the record that was overlooked or ignored by the moving party.
In that event, the moving party must respond by making an attempt to demonstrate
the inadequacy of this evidence, for it is only by attacking all the record evidence
allegedly supporting the nonmoving party that a party seeking summary judgment
satisfies Rule 56's burden of production. Once the moving party has attacked
55

See Celotex v. Catrett, supra 47 , at 329 - 334.
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whatever record evidence - if any - the nonmoving party purports to rely upon,
the burden of production shifts to the nonmoving party, who must either (1)
rehabilitate the evidence attacked in the moving party's papers, (2) produce
additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial as provided
in Rule 56( e), or (3) submit an affidavit explaining why further discovery is
necessary as provided in Rule 56(f). See lOA Wright§ 2727, pp. 138-143.
Summary judgment should be granted if the nonmoving party fails to respond in
one or more of these ways, or if, after the nonmoving party responds, the Court
determines that the moving party has met its ultimate burden of persuading the
Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. See, e. g., First
National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253,289 ( 1968). Thus,
if the record disclosed that the moving party had overlooked a witness who would
provide relevant testimony for the nonmoving party at trial, the Court could not
find that the moving party had discharged its initial burden of production unless
the moving party sought to demonstrate the inadequacy of this witness' testimony.
Absent such a demonstration, summary judgment would have to be denied on the
ground that the moving party had failed to meet its burden of production under
Rule 56." Under that second option, as noted above by Justice Brennan in Celotex v. Catrett56 , the
moving party must still "affirmatively show the absence of evidence in the record. Ante, at 323.
This may require the moving party to depose the nonmoving party's witnesses or to establish the
inadequacy of documentary evidence. If there is literally no evidence in the record, the moving
party may demonstrate this by reviewing for the Court the admissions, interrogatories, and other
exchanges between the parties that are in the record. Either way, however, the moving party must
affirmatively demonstrate that there is no evidence in the record to support a judgment for the
nonmoving party."
For "plainly, a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence is
insufficient," as otherwise, "such a 'burden' of production is no burden at all[,] and would

56

See Celotex v. Catrett, supra 47 , at 329 - 334.
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simply permit [the] summary judgment procedure[,] to be converted into a tool for harassment [
of the non-moving party]. See Louis 750-751." This is exactly what the Plaintiff hereby argues,
that regardless of the path taken by the moving party, and if the burden of proof would be upon
the non-moving party at trial, that, the party moving for summary judgment must do more than
just make conclusory statements and point to the record in their motion and memorandum. They
must also bring forth some form of additional evidence to prove that their version of the truth is
the real truth, and not the truth, that they claim is potentially masquerading around as the truth,
that the non-moving party has offered the Court. For to allow otherwise, the Plaintiff argues, is
not within the notions of: decency, truth, justice, and fairness espoused by the United States
Constitution, and the very foundations of law.
Furthermore, addressing this issue requires that this and every Court think beyond, and
outside the usual strict confines of the legal profession, and into the worlds of philosophy, metaphysics, morality, and ethics which are all somewhat inextricably linked in many ways, as
schools of thought and debate, with that of the legal profession, to help clear up this issue. In so
doing, the Plaintiff raises a sub issue for this Court to decide, as well as the very question of: ls
it right that the moving party is awarded a semi-advantage as it were, over the non-moving party,
by allowing the moving party to simply be able to make an accusation and point to the record
stating that there is an absence of material fact on an element of the claim by the non-moving
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party? For while potentially true, such a fact may be missing from the record, but that may or
may not be by design of the non-moving party57 :

-

"We do not mean that the nonmoving party must produce evidence in a form that
would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment. Obviously, Rule
56 does not require the nonmoving party to depose her own witnesses. Rule 56( e)
permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of
evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves,
and it is from this list that one would normally expect the nonmoving party to
make the showing to which we have referred."
As all that is actually proven by the moving party, is that said material fact is potentially
not on the record. Not that said material fact does or does not exist; did or did not happen; or is
true or false, as the moving party thereby suggests to the Court. As without some form of
additional evidence brought forth by the moving party to back up their assertion that their
version of the truth is the real truth, and not the truth potentially masquerading as the truth, the
moving party simply turns the summary judgment procedure, into a tool for harassment of the
non-moving party by the moving party. Interestingly, as Justice Brennan stated in his dissenting
opinion above 58 , that" ... [r]ather, as the Court confirms, a party who moves for summary
judgment on the ground that the nonmoving patty has no evidence must affirmatively show the
absence of evidence in the record. Ante, at 323. This may require the moving party to depose

the nonmoving party's witnesses or to establish the inadequacy of documentary evidence."
This is an interesting side note and view into the Supreme Court and the mind of Justice
Brennan, as it does seem to indicate, as the Plaintiff also hereby contends, that while there may
57
58

See generally Celotex v. Catrett, supra 47 , at 324.
See Celotex v. Catrett, supra 47 , at 329 334.
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be thousands upon thousands of legal theories and methods to, " ... establish the inadequacy of
documentary evidence." That the word itself, "Establish," carries with it a connotation of an

onerous burden placed upon the moving party, to produce something more than mere speculation
or accusation, when attempting to ".... establish the inadequacy of [any of the) documentary
evidence [that the non-moving party relies upon, in a proceeding for summary judgment]."

For"[ w]e must remember always[,] that accusation is not proof[,] and that conviction depends
upon evidence and due process of law." 59 Otherwise, we return right back to, as Justice Brennan
stated in his dissenting opinion above 56 , a" ... 'burden' of production[ which ]is no burden at
all[,] and would simply permit summary judgment procedure to be converted into a tool for
harassment [of the non-moving party]. See Louis 750-751."
Furthermore, the Plaintiff argues that this courts' following is in line with not only the
majority opinion, in Celotex v. Catrett60 , but also Justice White's concurring opinion therein as
well, as Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion above, in Celotex v. Catrett 33 . For this Court
has stated 61 :
"This burden is onerous because even "[c]ircumstantial evidence can create a
genuine issue of material fact." See Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238
(1986); Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 868-69, 452 P.2d
362, 365-66 (1969)."

59

Edward R. Murrow, "See It Now," Television broadcast March, 9th 1954, on Columbia
Broadcast System, against, then Senator Joseph R. McCarthy.

60
61

See Celotex v. Catrett, supra 47 .
See McCoy v. Lyons, at 364, supra 9•
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Moreover, having followed that line of reasoning in other cases 62 , thus, as the Plaintiff
contends, it was in error for the District Court to allow summary judgment burden to be shifted
to the non-moving party in the instant case, for the most part. As the moving party in this case,
the Defendants, only made accusations and pointed to the record in their motion beyond that
incomplete affidavit, and thus, even as United States Supreme Court Justice Brennan as well as
Justice White noted in Celotex v. Catrett63 . That, while true, the moving party can choose the
second route for summary judgment, make an accusation, and point to the record, but the initial
burden of production is still upon them to prove that their version of the truth is the real truth.
Not the truth that is potentially masquerading around as the real truth, that the non-moving party
has submitted to the Court. Moreover, until that happens, the burden of production, simply, does
not shift to the non-moving party to rebut the moving party's argument with an argument,
evidence, or shift to the non-moving party, at all.
Thus, the District Court was clearly in error to award summary judgment to the
Defendants, as the Defendants had not properly completed their burden of production on many
of the issues that they raised for Summary Judgment, and thus, the Plaintiff was not required to
even respond to them on those issues. Moreover, on the one sub-point and not a main issue, the

62

See Shelton v. Shelton, 148 Idaho 560, 564 n.4, 225 P.3d 693, 697 n.4 (2009), at 699; Smith v.
Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714,918 P.2d 583 (1996), at 588. Also Tingley v.
Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89,867 P.2d 960,963 (1994);Thornson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126
Idaho 527, 530, 887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994); G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho
514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991 ); , 452 P.2d 362, 365-66 (1969); Christiansen v. Rumsey, 91 Idaho 684,
429 P.2d 416 (1967).
63 See Celotex v. Catrett, supra 47 .
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Plaintiff aptly and logically refuted their claims on a singular produced incomplete affidavit.
Furthermore, the District Court was clearly in error to award summary judgment to the
Defendants based upon the assumption therefore made by it, that if one item is brought forward
to meet burden of production on one issue by the moving party, that the nonmoving party must
then respond on all the fronts and issues therefore brought forth by the moving party. See this
Court's above referenced case of Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc. 64 .

2) The District Court erred by introducing bias and subtitle
discrimination, based upon Plaintiff's disability, into the
proceedings.
It is beyond abhorrent and reprehensible in our society that a person faces discrimination
based upon their disability, twenty-three years after the Americans with Disabilities Act
(Hereinafter: ADA) was initially passed. To prevent this detestable act, the United States
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 65 Moreover, it found that
"historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite
some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue
to be a serious and pervasive social problem."66

64
65
66

Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,887 P.2d 1034 (1994), at 1037- 1038.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1210l(b)(l).
42 U.S.C. § 1210l(a)(2).
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For those reasons, the United States Congress prohibited discrimination against
individuals with disabilities by many entities and in many different areas, including, by public
entities 67 :
"[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity." (The United States Congress, 42 U.S.C. § 12132., emphasis mine)
Thus, in first and foremost addressing this question, five threshold questions must be
answered first. One, is the 11th Amendment of the United States Constitution 68 and its provision
rendering states, and those in their employ or acting under powers or duties bestowed by the
same, immune from prosecution for their actions without permission of said state? E.G. the legal
Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, as it applies to the States. Two, does the legal Doctrine of
Judicial Immunity, render a judicial officer, immune for violations of civil rights laws, especially
the ADA? Three, is the Court a "Public entity", as defined by ADA? Four, is the Plaintiff
considered a "qualified individual with a disability" as defined by ADA? Fifth, and finally, did
the Plaintiff attempt to communicate to, or otherwise, inform the Court of such disability
existing, as to attempt to prevent said potential discrimination from happening, by making sure
that the Court was informed that the Plaintiff had the said disability? In addressing one, the

67

See the United States Congress, 42 U.S.C. § 12132., emphasis mine.
See US Const. 11 th Amendment(February 7, 1795) ("The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.") Which modified US Const. Article III, section 2 on March 4, 1794, by a vote of the
United States Congress which Ratified it February 7, 1795.
68
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Plaintiff hereby points this Court to the following United States Supreme Court case of
Tennessee v. Lane 69 , where it held at 533-534, that sovereign immunity was properly waived
with respect to the fundamental right of accessing the courts. Moreover, a reading of that case
also reveals that an argument can be made for forced waiver of sovereign immunity with respect
to other rights as well, such as rights involving basic constitutional guarantees 70 , basic rights 71 ,or
other fundamental rights

72 ,

are otherwise involved. See also United States v. Georgia73 , where

they stated the following, regarding the majorities discussion on Congress's enforcement powers:

"[ ... ]The Court holds that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
validly abrogates state sovereign immunity at least insofar as it creates a private
cause of action for damages against States for conduct that violates the
Constitution. Ante, at 159.[ ... ]" (omissions mine)
See also Title 5 of the ADA section 12202 74 , where the United States Congress, under the
heading of "State immunity", states the following: "A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of
the United States from an action in Federal or State Court of competent jurisdiction
for a violation of this chapter. In any action against a State for a violation of the
requirements of this chapter, remedies (including remedies both at law and in
equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are
69

See United States Supreme Court case of Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 124 S. Ct. 1978,
158 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2004), at 533-534.
70 Id. at 522, supra 69
71 Id. at 522 supra 69
72 Id. at 524, 534 supra 69
73 United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 126 S. Ct. 877, 163 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006)(Justice
Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined in writing the concurring opinion) at 160.
74 See 42 U.S.C § 12202
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available for such a violation in an action against any public or private entity other
than a State." -(ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12202, brackets and text in them in original,
2013) . Thus, rendering the state, and those in their employ or acting under powers or duties
bestowed by the same, not immune from prosecution for their actions, especially violations of
the ADA and other civil rights laws.
In addressing the second threshold question, the Plaintiff points this Court, to the 4th
Circuit Court of Appeals case of Livingston v. Guice 75 , in which the United States Government
filed a friend of the Court, or amicus curiae brief, regarding this exact second threshold question
posed. In that friend of the Court brief, the United States Government through the Department of
Justice, stated in pertinent part, the following: "At the outset, it is important to note that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
suits against States or state officials under Title II of the ADA. Congress can
oven-ide the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity by legislation pursuant to
constitutionally delegated legislative powers. See, e.g.,Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445, 454-456 (1976) (Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. I (1989) (Commerce Clause). To be sure, any such
abrogation must be [']unmistakably clear.['] Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234,242 (1985). Congress could not have been clearer, however, in its
statement in the ADA abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 42 U.S.C.
12202.2[, which provides[see footnote 2, which denoted the following]: A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State Court
of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter. In any action
against a State for a violation of the requirements of this chapter,
remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for
such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such

75

4 th Circuit Court of Appeals case of Livingston v. Guice, 68 F.3d 460 (4th Cir. 1995),
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a violation in an action against any public or private entity other than a
State. -]
Given the abrogation of state immunity by the ADA, state judges would be subject
to personal or official action suits under the ADA but for the doctrine of judicial
immunity. It is clear that this doctrine generally affords judges immunity from
damage suits. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). [see footnote 3,
which denoted the following]: Judicial immunity against damage actions, however, is not absolute. The
Supreme Court has held that judges can be held liable for damages in suits
challenging their administrative actions. See Farrester v. White, 484 U.S.
219, 224-225 ( 1988) (explaining that with regard to immunity questions
other than those decided by [']express constitutional or statutory
enactment,['] the Court applies a [']functional['] approach to evaluate the
effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on
the appropriate exercise of those functions). - ]
In Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984), however, the Supreme Court held that
this immunity does not extend to injunctive suits. In the present case, plaintiff
sought only injunctive and declaratory relief against Judge Guice. Inexplicably, the
District Court did not even cite, much less discuss, the Supreme Court's controlling
decision in Pulliam. Accordingly, the District Court's holding that judicial
immunity barred plaintiffs complaint against Judge Guice must be reversed." (The United States Government through the Department of Justice, friend of the
Court brief in Livingston v. Guice, 68 F.3d 460 (4th Cir. 1995), Pg. 6-7, with
footnote inclusion, converted from textulized version offered on Ada.gov website,
footnote inclusion, singled quotation marks, indention of footnotes, and other
minor readability and grammatical flow changes mine) Therefore, given the above, as well as the United States Supreme Court's holdings above
on Judicial immunity, Judicial immunity is not absolute. Furthermore, in the Memorandum of
the United States Government, through the Department of Justice, in the lower Court, in
Livingston v. Guice 7576 , in which they responded in pertinent part to the other side in that case
claims and arguments that equitable relief is the only form of remedy available to a private party

76

See Livingston v. Guice, supra at

75
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under Title II of the ADA, that in fact, all fonns ofrelief are actually available to the petitioner,
not just equitable relief.
In addressing the third threshold question, the Plaintiff simply points to Title II 77 of the
amended and new ADA(2008), which states:
"Public entity means( 1) Any State or local government;
(2) Any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a
State or States or local government; and
(3) The National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority (as
defined in section 103(8) of the Rail Passenger Service Act)." (Title 42 U.S.C.
Chapter 126, Sub-section 2, Part A,§§ 12131 (1) of title II of the American with
Disabilities Act, 2008) Moreover, the Plaintiff hereby further contends that the courts of Idaho, including this
78

Court, fall under both· (1) and (2) of the new and amended ADA(2008), as can clearly be seen
above. In addressing the fourth threshold, the Plaintiff simply points to Title II of the 2008
amended ADA 79 , which states: "Qualified individual with a disability means an individual with a disability who,
with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the
removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the
provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements
for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by
a public entity."

77 Title

42 U.S.C. Chapter 126, Sub-section 2, Part A,§§ 12131 (1) of Title II.
See Title 42 U.S.C. Chapter 126, Sub-section 2, Part A,§§ 12131 (1)(1) and (2) of the new
and amended ADA(2008).
79 Alternatively Referenced as Title 42 U.S.C. Chapter 126, Sub-section 2, Part A,§§ 12131 (2).
78
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Furthermore, the Plaintiff contends that one, a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities(MLA) of such individual is a disability as
recognized by the amended ADA(2008) 80 . Thus, under that premise, and using the MLA of
leaming 81 , it can be seen that the Plaintiff submitted a copy to the Court of his Individualized
Education Plan(IEP), otherwise known as the Plaintiffs Ex. E.(R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. E,
Ln.(No line number available, as this reference is to an entire document form the record), which
was created and used during his minority, under and in connection with the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act(IDEA) 82 , and the Idaho Public School System. Further, the term IEP
is defined thereunder ID EA 83 as: "The term 'individualized education program' or 'IEP' means a written statement
for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in
accordance with section 1414(d) of this title."
Further, "child with a disability'', is therefore generally defined under IDEA 8284 as
meaning, a child: (i) with intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech
or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious
emotional disturbance (referred to in this chapter as "emotional disturbance"),
orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments,

80

See under Title 42 U.S.C. Chapter 126 §§ 12102.l(a).
As allowed by 42 U.S.C. § 12102.2(a) under the revised 2008 ADA.
82 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act(IDEA) 82 , is found at Title 20 U.S.C. § 1400 1482.
83 Title 20 U.S.C. § 1401.10
84 Title 20 U.S.C. § 1401.3(a).
81
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or specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special
education and related services." Moreover, the term "child with a disability" is also so defined under IDEA 8285 , as
meaning a child whom, is ages 3 through 9, or any subset of that age range, and may, at the
discretion of the State and the local educational agency, include a child who is: " ... (i) experiencing developmental delays, as defined by the State and as measured
by appropriate diagnostic instruments and procedures, in 1 or more of the
following areas: physical development; cognitive development; communication
development; social or emotional development; or adaptive development; and (ii)
who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.'' -

Furthermore, a copy of the Plaintiffs Social Security Disability Insurance(SSDI) Award
letter, from post-majority, is on file with the Court, as Plaintiffs Ex. G (R. Vol. 5, Pg. - no page
number available), as reference is an entire document from the record, and due to the lower
Court clerk appeals mistake were not properly included in the record, until the last minute.
Plaintiffs Ex. G., Ln. (no line number available, as this reference is to an entire document from
the record), which notes the existing and prior learning disability as well as other newer and
additional disabilities therefore medically found, during Plaintiffs Social Security disability
case, which also limit other defined 2008 ADA MLAs.
Not to also mention that a copy of the Plaintiffs Social Security Supplemental
Insurance(SSI) Award letter, from post-majority, is also on file with the Court, as Plaintiffs Ex.
N.(R. Vol. 5, Pg. (No page number available, as reference is an entire document from the record,

and due to the lower Court clerk appeals mistake were not properly included in the record, until
85

Title 20 U.S.C. § 1401.3(b)
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the last minute.) Plaintiffs Ex. N., Ln. (no line number available, as this reference is to an entire
document from the record)), as well as a copy of the Plaintiffs initial filling, post majority, for
SSDI upon his own record, which was denied due to Plaintiff not having enough credits, or any
Social Security earnings record due to not being able to work, as well as SSDI Child's Disability,
off of the Defendant's Social Security record, and SSI, as Plaintiffs Ex. K (R. Vol. 5, Pg. (no
page number available, as reference is an entire document from the record, and due to the lower
Court clerk appeals mistake were not properly included in the record, until the last minute.)) As
well as a copy of the Plaintiffs copy of an email detailing accommodations made for Plaintiffs
final 2008 GED testing session, under Plaintiffs IEP and IDEA 82 , due to prior and existing
learning disability, from the then outgoing head official for Boise State University Adult Basic
Education Program in Boise Idaho, as Plaintiffs Ex. I.(R. Vol. 5, Pg. (no page number
available, as reference is an entire document from the record, and due to the lower Court clerk
appeals mistake were not properly included in the record, until the last minute.)), Plaintiffs Ex.
I., Ln. (no line number available, as this reference is to an entire document from the record)).
Thus, as the Plaintiff contends, there exists not only a record of an impairment 86 , as allowed in
the 2008 amended ADA, but also a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more MLA of such individual as allowed in the 2008 amended ADA 87 .
Furthermore, two, not only as Plaintiffs Ex. I (R. Vol. 5, Plaintiffs Ex. I., Ln. (no line
number available, as this reference is to an entire document from the record)), as well as

86

87

See Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102.l(B)
Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102.1 (A).
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Affidavits from that of the Plaintiffs Mother, Vicki Lynn Woodley(maiden: Mefford)(R. Vol. 4,
Pages:, Plaintiffs Ex. 0 -S., Ln. (no line number available, as this reference is to an entire
document from the record)), (R. Vol. 5, Pg. (no page number available, as reference is an entire
document from the record, and due to the lower Court clerk appeals mistake were not properly
included in the record, until the last minute.)), Plaintiffs Ex. 1., Ln. (no line number available,
as this reference is to an entire document from the record)), shows that there are independent
entities beyond the Plaintiff whom regard the Plaintiff as having a disability, as allowed under
the 2008 amended ADA, under Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102. l(C). Thus, the third prong of the
AD A's (2008) definition for disability is also met, for that of the Plaintiff. Therefore, the
Plaintiff clearly, or six ways to Sunday to use an often used idiom, meets the ADA's (2008)
definition for disability, and thus, is therefore disabled under it, and its protections.
In addressing the fifth, and final threshold question, i.e. Did the Plaintiff attempt to
communicate to, or otherwise inform, the Court of such disability existing, as to attempt to
prevent said potential discrimination from happening, by making sure that the Court was
informed that the Plaintiff had the said disability? As the record will show, not only were there
plenty of exhibits, as above mentioned, but the Plaintiffs own verified complaint and other
pleadings denote this very fact.(R. Vol. 2, Pg.166; 16 7; 170 Ln.15-17 ;3-4;24-28). Moreover, as
both the record and transcripts will show, the Plaintiff did not only through the various
pleadings, but through verbal communications with the Court and the Defendant's legal counsel,
while in Com1 proceedings, inform them that the Plaintiff had such a disability, and in fact,
multiple concurrent and non-concurrent impairments, that also represent other multiple
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disabilities. See the following portions of the April I I th, 2013 Motion Hearing on that of the
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, for a quick overview: "THE COURT: All right. So Court has reviewed the pleadings in the file. And
Miss Woodley is appearing prose. And I'll let her address the Court. I guess 1 have
a couple of questions. And I think I established this last time. Mr. Stanger, you
have taken the positions throughout these proceedings that you have a disability.
And --but you do not have a guardian. Is that correct?
MR. ANDREW STANGER: No, I do not have guardian. That's correct." - (Tr.
Vol. 3, Pg. 32, L. 9-19, Motion Hearing April 11th, 2013)Also, see the following from the transcripts, of the Motion Hearing on April 11th, 2013 :- "THE COURT: Right. I'm trying to provide a forum. I've always been respectful
of person attempting to represent themselves in Court. Although, I cannot bend
over backwards and make -- allow them special leeway because of that. But I've
not discouraged them simply because they are prose. But, you know, the Court's
time and the -- and the personnel that are here working on the case, everybody's
time's pretty valuable. And I don't want to get completely through a process and
of Mr.
then you know, right now I've been provided no documentation that
Stanger's disability other than his self-reported statements that he has a depressive
disorder, if I understand, which would be a mental health depression.
MR. ANDREW STANGER: Correct, Your Honor. I have presented, I do believe,
a copy that was accidentally inferior of my individualized." - (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 37, L.
7-22, Motion Hearing April 11th, 2013 )- "[ ... ]education plan that was prepared and followed by the Idaho public schools
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act pre majority.
THE COURT: Okay. Understanding learning disabilities exist with potentially you
and other people in my mind doesn't necessarily equate to the same thing as
incompetence to the point that you have to have a guardian and a conservator.
Because, if you're that incompetent, then maybe your decision to file a lawsuit isn't
even being made rationally. So I don't know where you're at on that.
MR. ANDREW STANGER: And see, I don't really know how to answer that,
Your Honor. I mean, that's a question that I can't honestly answer.
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THE COURT: All right. Absent any evidence that I have on the record today to
demonstrate that you need a guardian to represent you and an attorney that -because you don't understand what you're trying to do, I don't have any evidence
that suggests that to me. And you know, I believe interested parties, persons under
our statutes could file to seek to be appointed your guardian which would be they'd
make all your decisions for you in life, guardian or even financial." - {Tr. Vol. 3, p.
38, L. 1-25, Motion Hearing April 11th, 2013, omission mine)Also, see the following from the transcripts, of the Motion Hearing on April 11th, 2013 :-"THE COURT: Law sites?
Okay. All right. I take it you read and understand the English language given all of
this work you've put together.
MR. ANDREW STANGER: Yes, Your Honor. They did test me in elementary
level, and they did find that at fourth grade, when they tested me on the Idaho
standards test for elementary students, that I had a college grade reading level at
that point. But I still had the issues from the learning disability as well that affected
other areas.
THE COURT: Yeah. But based upon that, you still have a college level reading
level or[ ... ]" - (Tr. Vol. I, p. 80, L. 13-25, Motion Hearing April 11th, 2013,
omission mine)Also, see the following from the transcripts, of the Motion Hearing on April 11th, 2013:'Then on to the issue of back -- or not back -- continuing child support, I was
born premature and I was born with a cognitive learning disability. It is
characterized in the Idaho Code as an intellectual disability. It used to be known as
mental retardation. In fact, some of my[ ... ]"- (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 70, L. 20-25, Motion
Hearing April 11th, 2013, omission mine for shortening)Also, see the following from the transcripts of the Motion Hearing on April 1 1th, 2013.
(Tr. Vol. 3, p. 73-74, Ln. 1-25, and Ln.1-7, Motion Hearing on April 11th, 2013). With these
threshold questions settled, there exists one last threshold question to settle, which is, what is
discrimination? It is well known that discrimination can take many fonns, can be difficult to

RE-DONE INITIAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF

PAGE#72

define, and can be blatant and outright or it can be subtitle, and almost, if not imperceptible,
some times. However, the common man's legal definition of discrimination is "The act of
denying rights, benefits, justice, equitable treatment, or access to facilities available to all others,
to an individual or group of people because of their race, age, gender, handicap or other defining
characteristic. " 88 Moreover, on a broader level, the term simply means the act of making a
distinction89 . It has often denoted a distinction that is "sometimes ... unjust" 90 or made ''on the
basis of prejudice." 91
Furthermore, Black's Law Dictionary offers two central definitions of discrimination that
are based loosely on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. According to Black's Law Dictionmy,
discrimination is either "[t]he effect of a law or established practice that confers privileges on a
certain class or that denies privileges to a certain class because of race, age, sex, nationality,
religion, or handicap" or "[d]ifferential treatment; esp[ecially] a failure to treat all persons
equally when no reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those not
favored. " 92

88

''Law Dictionary: htt ://thelawdictiona .or article/how-to- rovediscrimination/#ixzz2fMvGZYHV", Retrieved on September 191\ 2013.
89
See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
Page. 517(Houghton Mifflin 4th ed. 2000) (defining "discriminate" as ''to make a clear
distinction," "to distinguish," or "to differentiate").
90
See FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 724 (Isaac K. Fund et al. eds., 1963).
91
See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 89 , at 517.
92
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (7th ed. 1999, emphasis added).

RE-DONE INITIAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF

PAGE# 73

Thus, it is this disabled persons' and therefore the Plaintiffs' as well, contention, that the
District Court clearly erred by awarding Summary Judgment to the Defendant's, on the basis that
even after the Plaintiff had told the Court that the Plaintiff had disabilities, and then submitted
proof of one of those disabilities existing both pre and post majority. Moreover, was even
regarded as having that one disability during both pre and post majority by other individuals
besides the Plaintiff himself, who also supplied the Court with affidavits from other individuals
detailing this fact.
That the Court could not find that such a disability could have, or did exist, as the
Plaintiff claimed, simply because the Plaintiff '·currently appeared" to be articulate, respectful,
and intelligent, was able to speak and act for himself, perform such legal research, analysis, and
writing, for the instant case that was before the Court, and thus awarded the case to the
Defendants. Not because, as the Plaintiff contends, the facts, arguments, testimony, and evidence
backed up such a said conclusion, but simply, because, the Plaintiff "currently appeared'' to be
ai1iculate, respectful, and intelligent, was able to speak and act for himself, perform such legal
research, analysis, and writing, for the instant case that was before the Court, nothing more. See
generally again the following portions of the April 11, 2013 Motion Hearing on that of the
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 93, for a quick overview of the above and the
position of the Court: -

93

(Tr. Vol. 3, Pg. 39-40, L. 5-22 and 1-11, Motion Hearing April 11 1\ 2013); (Tr. Vol. 3, Pg. 70,
L. 20-25 , Motion Hearing April l I t11, 2013, omission mine)-.
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"THE COURT: Okay. So we're going to proceed with the arguments today. The
Court is not a --I'm a judge. I'm not a mental health professional like a psychiatrist
or psychologist, nor am I specially trained in evaluating persons' intellectual
capacities to make decisions about whether they would be competent in the sense
of understanding what they're doing. But from my observations of the pleading
presented in -- by Mr. Stanger, filed in this case, and his ability to articulate in
Court, answer the Court's questions, make reasoned responses, I -- there's nothing
that would suggest to me that he is not capable of representing himself if that's his
choice today other than the fact he doesn't have a law degree and doesn't have the
educational background that a lawyer has or educational or practical experiences
that a lawyer would bring with him to the courtroom. He, like others who are pro
se, deal with the limitations of not having a legal education or background ..
But on the same token, persons are allowed to represent themselves in Court. And
so I don't -- from listening to you and observing you, you don't appear to be at any
disadvantage over other pro se litigants that I have had in my Court. And In fact, in
many regards, seem to be more capable than many pro se litigants I've had in Court
as far as your ability to assimilate legal authority and put together pleadings. And I
think the pleadings are pretty self-evident in that they're very extensive, organized.
So -- now, having had that discussion with Mr. Stanger, Miss Woodley, you're his
mother?" (Tr. Vol. 3, Pg. 39-40, L. 5-22 and 1-11, Motion Hearing March 11 1\
2013)Also the following from the above same Motion Hearing on April 11 1\ 2013 93 :
-"THE COURT: Law sites?
Okay. All right. I take it you read and understand the English language given all of
this work you've put together.
MR. ANDREW STANGER: Yes, Your Honor. They did test me in elementary
level, and they did find that at fourth grade, when they tested me on the Idaho
standards test for elementary students, that I had a college grade reading level at
that point. But I still had the issues from the learning disability as well that affected
other areas.
THE COURT: Yeah. But based upon that, you still have a college level reading
level or[ ... ]" - (Tr. Vol. I, p. 80, L. 13-25 , Motion Hearing March 111' \ 2013 )- "Then on to the issue of back -- or not back - - continuing child support, I was
born premature and I was born with a cognitive learning disability. It is
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characterized in the Idaho Code as an intellectual disability. It used to be known as
mental retardation. In fact, some ofmy[ ... ]"-(Tr.Vol. 3, Pg. 70, 20-25, Motion
Hearing March 1 1tl1, 2013, omission mine)Additionally, see generally the following lines from the lower Court's opinion on the
order granting the Defendant's their Motion for Summary Judgment, which is in the record, and
· pertment
·
state d m
part 94 ,: -

"As an initial matter, the Court has made a determination that the Plaintiff is
competent to proceed with this action despite his claims that he has been diagnosed
with disabilities over the course of his life, and is currently receiving disability
benefits for a mental health related diagnosis. At the hearing on this motion, the
Court made special inquiry of the Plaintiff to ensure that he understood the
proceedings, that he did not feel it necessary to be represented by a guardian, and
that the Plaintiff himself had researched and prepared the extensive filings in this
action. The Court is satisfied, after having observed the Plaintiff in Court and
based upon his ability to research and write the documents filed in this action, that
the Plaintiff is not so impaired that the Court would be uncomfortable moving
forward with the determination of this motion on the merits .

[ ... ]
The Court is mindful of the Plaintiff's needs and his claims of disability, however,
the Court is also in possession of the Plaintiff's extensive fillings and clear ability
to research, reason, and put into writing his arguments as to the applicable law and
facts. Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiff is not entitled to any special
accommodations and the Court will treat the Plaintiff in the same manner as other
pro se litigants in civil actions." - (R. Vol. 5, p. 781-782, L. 13-25 , Order granting
the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, June 1?1\ 2013, omissions mine
for shorting)Furthermore, as an additional question which is hereby raised for this Court's
consideration, under this same issue and argument, with a focus upon intent vs. simple mistake,

94

(R. Vol. 5, p. 781-782, L. 13-25 , Order granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, June I ?111, 2013, omissions mine for shorting)
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as the word "en-or" can-ies with it a connotation of simple mistake, like for example, whoops, I
just misplaced my keys. Whereas the word "violate" carries with it a connotation of intent, and is
stronger and more definitive than that of person whom has made a simple mistake. For example,
suppose Billy calls Amy names, and Amy throws a snowball at him. Amy's intent is to hit Billy
with a snowball so that Billy will stop his taunts of her. Whereas if Amy slipped on a patch of
ice, throwing snow on Billy, the result may be the same. Billy covered in snow, but one was
purely unintentional accident, while the other, to stop his taunts of her, can-ied an intent or an
second ulterior motive to Billy becoming covered in snow.
Thus, in raising the additional question with that of intent vs. simple mistake, did the
District Court violate, Title II-Part A 95 of the ADA as amended in 2008. By introducing bias and
subtitle discrimination into the proceedings, cloaked in respectfulness, by claiming that because
the Plaintiff did not appear to have some physical manifestation of claimed disability, was
intelligent, articulate, and able to perform such legal research, analysis, and writing for the
instant case, that the Plaintiff did or could not have had such disability complained of?

3)Attorneys Fees and Costs
A. Issue
The Plaintiff raises this issue as a twofold issue, one, as required by Court rule and law, a
party must raise their claim for attorney fees and costs in their initial brief, for such fees and
95

Title II - Part A(Title 42 U.S.C. Chapter 126, Sub-section 2, Part A , §§ l 2 l 3 l- l 2134)of the
American with Disabilities Act(Title 42 U.S.C., Chapter 126, §§ 12101 et seq.), as amended in
2008 (P.L. 110-325).
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costs to even be awarded upon appeal. Second, the Plaintiff raises this issue a simple but
common sense contention that the Plaintiff has with this Court, and its associated rulings, that
because a party is appearing pro-se or pro-per and not "being represented" by an attorney at law.
They are forbidden from, upon wining their case either upon appeal or at the trial level, being
awarded rightfully won and reasonable Attorney's Fees and Costs, just because they are not
being represented by an attorney at law, vs. that of themselves. For simply, in one of this Court's
earlier holdings , which every other holding preventing those whom appear pro-se or pro-per
from collecting attorney's fees and reasonable costs, points to as the origination of the rule.
Which is Curtis v. Campbell 96 , in which this Court just simply said as part of its holding, "Since
Curtis has appeared in this appeal pro se no attorney fees are allowed,'' without any reasoning,
without any discussion, or legal citation. It just took upon itself to declare that people whom
appear pro-se, are not allowed to recover attorney fees, completely out of the blue. For while
true, there are many other jurisdictions whom have likewise stated the same, while on the other
hand, there are others, which have stated that pro-se persons are eligible to retrieve Attorney's
fees.

B. Rule
That such a claim made upon appeal, must also contain reasoned argument and authority,
otherwise it will be denied. Moreover, a request for award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 41 is not sufficient to raise the issue of attorney fees on appeal. See Robbins v.

96

Curtis v. Campbell, I 05 Idaho 705, 672 P.2d I 035 (1983).
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County of Blaine, among other sources 97 . Moreover, this Court has said in Reed v. Reed 98 , that
"[ s]pecifically, attorney fees are appropriate if an appeal simply invites an appellate Court to
second-guess the trial Court on conflicting evidence." Quoting from this Court's case of
DeChambeau v. Estate of Smith 99 , where this Court said:
·'We may grant attorney fees if an appeal [']simply invite[ s] an appellate Court to
second-guess the trial Court on conflicting evidence.['] Sun Valley Shamrock
Resources, Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 120, 794 P.2d 1389,
1393 (1990). " Furthermore, in Bream v. Benscoter 100 , this Court stated the following, on the issue of
Attorney's Fees:-.
"The District Court awarded the Benscoters attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §
12-120(3), which provides:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note,
bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase
or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial
transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be
allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the Court, to be taxed and
collected as costs.
The District Court held that the Benscoters were the prevailing party on Bream's
complaint and that they were entitled to an award of attorney fees for defending
against that claim. Bream argues that the District Court abused its discretion
because it failed to consider that Bream prevailed on the Benscoters' counterclaim.

97

Robbins v. County of Blaine, 134 Idaho 113, 996 P.2d 813 (2000). Also see I.A.R. Rules
4l(a); 35(a)(5); 35(b)(5). See also generally I.C. § 12-121; I.C. § 12-107; l.C. § 12-120;
Gustaves v. Gustaves, 57 P.3d 775, 138 Idaho 64 (2002) at 782.
98 Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 44 P.3d 1108 (2002) at 1117.
99 DeChambeau v. Estate of Smith, 132 Idaho 568, 572, 976 P.2d 922, 926 (1999) at 926.
100 Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364,369, 79 P.3d 723, 728 (2003) at 727 -729.
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The determination of who is a prevailing party is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial Court, and we will not disturb that determination absent an
abuse of discretion. Bolgerv. Lance, 137 ldaho 792, 53 P.3d 1211 (2002). To
prove an abuse of discretion, this Court applies the three-factor test. The three
factors are: ( 1) whether the trial Court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial Court acted within the boundaries of this discretion
and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available
to it; and (3) whether the trial Court reached its decision by an exercise ofreason.
Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 52 P.3d 848 (2002).
In this case, only the Benscoters requested an award of attorney fees. When
considering whether they were prevailing parties, the District Court stated,
[']When there are multiple claims, counterclaims, etc., each claim may be
examined individually in addition to looking at the overall result. If it becomes
apparent a party has prevailed on a particular claim or claims, the Court may, in its
discretion, apportion an award in a fair and equitable manner.['] The District Court
did not err in considering the parties' respective claims separately when deciding
whether the Benscoters were prevailing parties. Ramco v. H-K Contractors, Inc.,
118 Idaho 108, 794 P.2d 1381 (1990). The District Court also found that the core
issue in this case was Bream's claim to collect on the alleged guaranty of the
promissory note. The Benscoters' counterclaims for fraud and intentional infliction
of emotional distress were based upon Bream's conduct in attempting to collect on
the alleged guaranty. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
that the Benscoters were the prevailing parties on Bream's complaint.
The District Court awarded the Benscoters the sum of $5,000 as a reasonable
attorney fee for defending against the complaint. It concluded that the Benscoters
were entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) for
defending against the complaint because this was an action to recover in a
commercial transaction and because it was an action to recover on a note. Bream
alleges that the District Court erred because there was no commercial transaction
between him and the Benscoters. Bream does not challenge on appeal the District
Court's alternative holding that this was an action to recover on a note. Attorney
fees are awardable under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) for successfully defending
against an action to recover on a note. Spidell v. Jenkins, 111 Idaho 857, 727 P.2d
1285 (Ct.App.1986). Thus, we will not consider whether the District Court erred in
holding that this was an action on a commercial transaction because even if that
was in error, Bream has not challenged the District Court's alternative holding that
this was an action to recover on a note.[Because the issue was not raised on appeal,
we express no opinion on whether this is an action on a note or an action on a
guaranty, both of which arc included in Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).[Footnote l]
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D. Are the Benscoters Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal?
In their brief, the Benscoters request attorney fees on appeal as follows:
[']Benscoter seeks attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.AR. 41.['] We
have repeatedly held that we will not consider a request for attorney fees on appeal
that is not supported by legal authority or argument. Robbins v. County of Blaine,
134 Idaho 113, 996 P.2d 813 (2000) (request for award of attorney fees pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 is not sufficient to raise the issue of attorney fees on
appeal); Meisner v. Potlatch Corp., 131 Idaho 258, 954 P.2d 676 (1998) (single
conclusory sentence in the [']Conclusion['] section of the party's brief is not
sufficient to raise the issue of attorney fees on appeal); Petersen v. Franklin
County, 130 Idaho 176, 938 P.2d 1214 (1997) (request for award of attorney fees
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41 is not sufficient to raise the issue of attorney
fees on appeal); Buch in v. Lance, 128 Idaho 266, 912 P .2d 634 (1995) (request for
attorney fees on appeal, without stating the grounds for the request, is not
sufficient to raise the issue of attorney fees on appeal).
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 is not authority for the awarding of attorney fees on
appeal. It simply provides, [']Any party seeking attorney fees on appeal must
asse11 a claim as an issue presented on appeal in the first appellate brief filed by
such party as provided in Rules 35(a)(5) and 35(b )(5).['] Those rules both provide
that the party claiming attorney fees on appeal must include that claim as an issue
or additional issue on appeal, and the party must [']state the basis for the claim.[')
Idaho Appellate Rules 35(a)(6) and 35(b)(6) provide that the argument portion of
the brief must contain the contentions of the party [']with respect to the issues
presented on appeal, the reasons therefore, with citations to the authorities, statutes
and parts of the transcript and record relied upon.[']
Attorney fees are awardable only where they are authorized by statute or contract.
Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 682 P .2d 524 (1984). If the party is claiming
that a statute provides authority for an award of attorney fees, the party must cite to
the statute and, if applicable, the specific subsection of the statute upon which the
party relies. Appel v. LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 15 P.3d 1141 (2000). If the party
bases its claim for attorney fees upon a contract, then the party must likewise
identify that portion of the contract upon which the party relies as authority for the
awarding of attorney fees. The party must then provide a reasoned argument,
supported by case law as necessary, explaining why that statutory or contractual
provision entitles the party to an award of attorney fees in this instance. For
example, if the party seeks an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12
120(3) on the ground that the case is an action to recover in a commercial
transaction, the party should, to the extent necessary, provide facts, authority, and
argument supporting the claim that the case involves a [']commercial
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transaction['] and that such transaction is the gravamen of the lawsuit. Because the
Benscoters' have not supported their request for attorney fees on appeal with any
authority or argument, we will not consider that issue." - (Quotation marks singled
and footnote inclusion mine) That such a claim made upon appeal, must also contain reasoned argument and authority,
otherwise it will be denied. Moreover, a request for award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 41 is not sufficient to raise the issue of attorney fees on appeal. Second, see
generally the Idaho Court of Appeals case of Swanson & Setzke, Chtd. v. Henning 101 , and its
general review of the law and the pro-se attorney fee issue: "The Idaho Supreme Court has held that attorney fees may not be awarded to
parties who appear prose in civil litigation. O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 112 Idaho 472,
733 P.2d 693 (1987); Curtis v. Campbell, 105 Idaho 705, 672 P.2d 1035 (1983).
Today we must decide whether this general rule applies to lawyer litigants who
appear pro se. We hold that it does.

[ ... ]
The law firm contends that LC. § 12-120 mandates an attorney fee award to every
prevailing party, regardless of pro se status. Alternatively, the firm argues that any
prohibition against attorney fee awards to pro se litigants should be subject to an
exception for pro se lawyers. We will examine these arguments in turn.
Under the so-called [']American rule,['] as distinguished from the practice in
but only
England, a successful litigant may receive an award of attorney fees if
if- the award is authorized by contract, by statute or by an equitable principle
such as the "common fund" doctrine. Idaho Code § 12-120 authorizes such a fee
award. At subsection (3), the statute provides that ['][i]n any civil action to recover
on an open account ... the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney
fee to be set by the Court.. .. ['] This language contains no specific preclusion of an
award to a pro se litigant. However, the phrase [']attorney fee['] may be
interpreted to denote a monetary obligation (a fee) paid or owed from one person
(a client) to another person who has provided legal representation (an attorney).
101

Swanson & Setzke, Chtd. v. Henning, 116 Idaho 199, 203, 774 P.2d 909, 913 (Ct.App.1989),
at 910- 911.
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Under this interpretation, an attorney fee [']presupposes a relationship of attorney
and client['] which does not exist in prose situations. Davis v. Pan-att, 608 F.2d
717, 718 (8th Cir.1979). See also Cunningham v. Federal Bureau of Investigation,
664 F.2d 383 (3rd Cir.1981).
Courts adopting this interpretation of [']attorney fee['] have further noted that if a
fee-award statute is intended to benefit pro se litigants, the legislature can say so
expressly. Burke v. Department of Justice, 432 F. Supp. 251 (D.Kan. 1976), affd,
559 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir.1977); Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 38 Ill. App.3d 1, 349
N.E.2d 73 (1976); Parquit Corp. v. Ross, 273 Or. 900, 543 P.2d 1070 (1975). It
might be argued that prose litigants impliedly should benefit from fee-awarding
statutes - particularly those which encourage the assertion of claims favored in
public policy. However, the underlying intent of such statutes is not to generate pro
se litigation but to help litigants obtain counsel by providing a potential source of
fees in meritorious cases. E.g., Cofield v. City of Atlanta, 648 F.2d 986 (5th
Cir.1981 ).[The implied benefit argument is even less persuasive in the present case
because the fee-award statute at issue here, I.C. § 12-120, is policy-neutral. It
favors no claim or category oflitigant. DeWils Interiors, Inc. v. Dines, l 06 Idaho
288,294,678 P.2d 80, 86 (Ct.App. 1984).[Footnotel]
These reasons for denying attorney fees to pro se litigants have been criticized by
some commentators who advocate attorney fee awards for all prevailing parties,
whether or not they have been represented by counsel. See e.g., Note, Awarding
Attorneys' Fees to Prevailing Pro Se Litigants, 80 MICH.L.REV. 1111 ( 1982);
Note, Pro Se Can You Sue?: Attorney Fees for Pro Se Litigants, 34 STAN.L.REV.
659 ( 1982). Nevertheless, a clear majority of courts hold that if a nonlawyer
undertakes to represent himself in litigation, he is not entitled to an award of
attorney fees. See generally 20 AM.JUR.2D Costs § 77 ( 1965 and current
supplement).
In the Curtis and O'Neil cases cited above, the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted
this general rule. The Court first applied the rule in Curtis, where a nonlawyer pro
se litigant prevailed on appeal in an action on a promissory note. The action plainly
fell within the subject-matter scope of LC. § 12-120, and the note itself provided
for an attorney fee award to the prevailing party. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
declared: [']Since Curtis has appeared in this appeal prose [,] no attorney fees are
allowed.['] Curtis v. Campbell, 105 Idaho at 707,672 P.2d at 1037. In O'Neil, the
Court again declined to award fees to a nonlawyer pro se litigant - this time in a
tort action. The Court cited Curtis and stated that [']a pro se party is not entitled to
attorney fees.['] O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 112 Idaho at 480, 733 P.2d at 701.
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Although the Court was sharply divided on substantive issues in Curtis and O'Neil,
there was no apparent division on the question of whether prose parties could
receive attorney fee awards. Indeed, all four members of the present Court who sat
on those cases voted to deny such awards. Justices Shepard and Bakes voted to
deny fees in Curtis; Justices Huntley and Bistline cast similar votes in O'Neil.
Accordingly, we conclude that the general rule against attorney fee awards to pro
se litigants is the law in Idaho. It precludes any automatic award in this case under
LC.§ 12-120.'' (Swanson & Setzke, Chtd. v. Henning, 116 Idaho 199,203, 774
P.2d 909, 913 (Ct.App.1989), at 910 - 911,omissions for shorting for readability,
footnote inclusion, and singled quotations marks mine, all other changes in
original) --

C. Argument
Therefore, in view of the expansive interpretation of attorney at law vs. the pro-se or proper attorney fee issue given by other jurisdictions attorney fees denoted in the Idaho Court of
Appeals case of Swanson & Setzke, Chtd. v. Henning 101 , the following argument for Attorney
Fees and Costs is made by the Plaintiff. The classification hoisted upon that of pro-se and proper parties by this Court, in regards to attorney fees and costs. Is outright facially repugnant to
the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitutionw 2, under its proscription that: -

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." - (see US
CONST., AMEND XIV( 14), § 1, emphasis mine)-

102

See US CONST., AMEND XIV(l4), § l,(""All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.")
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As it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, by instituting an award of attorney fees to only a select group of persons,
Attorneys at law, and not all persons whom may be the prevailing party in the suit. Whether or
not they are Attorneys at law, pro-se, or pro-per, and thus, such a claim by this Court stating that
it is so, denies any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law, as is required by
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Likewise, it is also invalid, as it burdens the fundamental right of self-representation, which is
guaranteed under the 6th Amendment of the United States Constitution 103 as well as the Idaho
Constitution 1°4 . Moreover, such a fundamental right was even allowed prior to the ratification of
the United States Constitution as well as therefore after, by the United States Constitution's 6th
Amendment. As was noted in Faretta v. California 1°5 , where the United States Supreme Court
noted the following: "[i]n the federal courts, the right of self-representation has been protected by
statute since the beginnings of our Nation. Section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
I Stat. 73, 92, enacted by the First Congress and signed by President Washington
one day before the Sixth Amendment was proposed, provided that 'in all the courts
of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally
or by the assistance of counsel."'
Furthermore see also generally the United States Supreme Court case of Gideon v.
Wainwright 106 . Moreover, in State v. Clayton 1° 7 , this Court stated the following: -

See US CONST., 6th AMEND.
104 Art. 1, § 13, of the Idaho Constitution.
105 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), at 312.
106 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963).
103

RE-DONE INITIAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF

PAGE# 85

"It is well settled that an indigent defendant has a right to Court appointed counsel.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 ( 1972);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); I.C. §
19-852(a). The right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel.
State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 (1975). It does not necessarily include
the right to counsel of one's own choosing. State v. Wozniak, 94 Idaho 312,486
P.2d 1025 (1971), overruled on other grounds, State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4,539
P.2d 556 ( 1975); State v. Ames, 222 Kan. 88, 563 P.2d 1034 ( 1977); State v.
Pepperling, 582 P.2d 341 (Mont. 1978); Junior v. State, 91 Nev. 439, 537 P.2d
1204 ( 1975). The trial Court may, in its discretion, appoint new counsel for
[']good cause.['] LC. § 19-856. See State v. Ames, supra; State v. Salazar, 81 N.M.
512,469 P.2d 157 (App. 1970).

It is also well settled that the defendant has the right to reject Court appointed
counsel and conduct his own defense. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct.
2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Since such a decision amounts to a waiver of the
right to counsel, the defendant should be made aware of the problems inherent in
self-representation so that such waiver is knowingly and intelligently made. See
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); I.C. §
19-857." (singled quotation marks mine, State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 898, 606
P.2d 1000, 1002 (1980), at 1001.) -

Furthermore, the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Lippert 108 , in which it stated the
following: "The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13
of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel. The right to counsel does
not necessarily mean a right to the attorney of one's choice. State v. Clark, 115
Idaho 1056, 1058, 772 P.2d 263, 265 (Ct.App. 1989). Mere lack of confidence in
otherwise competent counsel is not necessarily grounds for substitute counsel in
the absence of extraordinary circumstances. State v. McCabe, 101 Idaho 727, 729,
620 P.2d 300,302 (1980); State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711,713,946 P.2d 1351, 1353
(Ct.App.1997). However, for "good cause" a trial Court may, in its discretion,
appoint a substitute attorney for an indigent defendant. I.C. § 19-856; State v.
Clayton, 100 Idaho 896,897,606 P.2d 1000, 1001 (1980); Peck, 130 Idaho at 713,
946 P.2d at 1353. The trial Court must afford the defendant a full and fair
opportunity to present the facts and reasons in support of a motion for substitution
107
108

State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896,898,606 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1980), at 1001.
See State v. Lippert, 181 P.3d 512 (2007), at 520 - 521.
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of counsel after having been made aware of the problems involved. Clayton, 100
Idaho at 898, 606 P.2d at 1002. An accused also has the right to waive Courtappointed counsel and to conduct his or her own defense. Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2540, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 581 (1975); State v.
Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 865, 781 P.2d 197, 202 (1989); Clayton, I 00 Idaho at
8 97, 606 P .2d at I 001. A defendant is not required to show good cause for the
desire to exercise that right. State v. Hoppe, 139 Idaho 871, 875, 88 P.3d 690, 694
(2003). Since such a decision amounts to a waiver of the right to counsel, the
defendant should be made aware of the problems inherent in self-representation so
that such waiver is knowingly and intelligently made. Clayton, I 00 Idaho at 897,
606P.2dat 1001. See also LC.§ 19-857.". Thus, given the following cases, which denote that Judicial orders "have long been held
to be state action governed by the Fourteenth Amendment." See Palmore v. Sidoti, and others 109 .
Thus, this Court's holding in Cm1is v. Campbell 96 , facially violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution 1°2 , by instituting an award of attorney
fees to only a select group of persons, Attorneys at law, and not all persons whom may be the
prevailing party in the suit. Whether or not they are Attorneys at law, pro-se, or pro-per, and
thus, such a claim by this Court stating that it is so, denies any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the law, as is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the l 4thAmendment
of the United States Constitution 1°2 . Further, the Plaintiff contends that the applicable standard of
judicial review, falls under strict scrutiny, as it burdens the Appellant's fundamental right of selfrepresentation, which is guaranteed under the 6th Amendment of the United States
Constitution 103 , as well as the Idaho Constitution 104 • Thus, the standard of review is determined

109

See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,433 n.l (1984); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14
(1948). Cf. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 n.16 (1987) (subjecting race conscious
federal Court remedial order to strict scrutiny).
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by applying the framework outlined by this Court in State v. Mowrey 1rn, where this Court stated:

"When considering the Fourteenth Amendment, strict scrutiny applies to
fundamental rights and suspect classes; intermediate scrutiny applies to
classifications involving gender and illegitimacy; and rational basis scrutiny
applies to all other challenges. For analyses made under the Idaho Constitution,
slightly different levels of scrutiny apply. Strict scrutiny, as under federal law,
applies to fundamental rights and suspect classes. Means-focus scrutiny, unlike
federal intermediate scrutiny, is employed [']where the discriminatory character of
a challenged statutory classification is apparent on its face and where there is also
a patent indication of lack of relationship between the classification and the
declared purpose of the statute.['] Rational basis scrutiny applies to all other
challenges. -(Id. at 754-55, 9 P.3d at 1220-21 (citations omitted)., singled
quotation marks mine) Thus, it is quite clear, given that the right in question is that of the right of selfrepresentation, moreover, that such a right is a fundamental right, thus, the correct standard to
apply to the question at hand, is strict judicial scrutiny. Thus, as this Court's holding in Curtis v.
Campbell 96, facially violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States and Idaho Constitution 1° 2104 , rendering such an order by this Court automatically
void. As the State of Idaho in the Idaho State Constitution Art. 21, § 20, adopted the United
States Constitution as the supreme law of the land 111 . Therefore, given that the United States
Constitution is the utmost supreme law of the land within the United States, and therefore the

110
111

See State v. Mowrey, 134 Idaho 751, 754, 9 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2000), at 1220 - 1221.
See that of Idaho Const. Art. 21 § 20 and that of the Idaho Const. Art. I § 3.
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State of Idaho as well 111 , no law nor ruling by any such Court under it, including this Com1, can
overrule it 112 .
Furthermore, in also following along with the reasoning in Edgar v. Mite Corp. 113 , in
which the United States Supreme Court stated 113 , "A state statute is void to the extent that it
actually conflicts with a valid Federal statute." One can reasonably ascertain that along with that
point and the following case of the United States Supreme Court that was quoted therein, of Ray
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 114 , which stated the following:

"[a] conflict will be found 'where compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility ... ,' Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where the state 'law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.' Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., [430 U.S. 519,] 526, 540-541 [(1977)]. Accord, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S.
351, 363 (1976)." - (Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 102 S. Ct. 2629, 73 L. Ed.
2d 269 (1982) at 631, quoting Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, I 58
( 1978), at 158)
That, the United States Supreme Court instituted a guideline or rule of law, which stated
that a State law will be found to violate the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution,
when either of the following two conditions ( or both) of the following conditions exist. One,
compliance with both the Federal and State laws is impossible, or two, " ... state law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress ... "
Therefore, as the compliance with both the Equal Protection Clause of the I 4th Amendment of
112

See United States Constitution Article VI, Clause 2, otherwise known as the "Supremacy
Clause."
113 Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 102 S. Ct. 2629, 73 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1982) at 631
114 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, I 58 (1978) at 158.
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the United States Constitution 102 , and its provision that no state shall deny any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law, and this Court's ruling that pro-se petitioners are not
entitled attorney's fees, are irreconcilable and otherwise physically impossible to legally obey.
One or the other must give, and as the United States Constitution is the supreme law of the
United States and the State of Idaho, given the United States Constitution supremacy clause, and
that of Idaho Constitution 111 .It must be this Court's decision that pro-se or pro-per petitioners are
not entitled attorney's fees in Curtis v. Campbell 96 , that has to be voided. See the United States
Constitution Art. 6 Clause 2: ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.") (Bolding and
underlining mine) See generally the similar proposition and reasoning in Ableman v. Booth 115 , ("Generally
holding that state comis cannot issue rulings that contradict the decisions of federal courts, citing
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. For the Supreme Court reasoned that
because the Supremacy Clause established federal law as the law of the land, that state courts

115

Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 16 L. Ed. 169, 1858 U.S. L.E.X.I.S. 676 (1859).(Generally
holding that state courts cannot issue rulings that contradict the decisions of federal courts, citing
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. For the Supreme Court reasoned that
because the Supremacy Clause established federal law as the law of the land, that state courts
could not nullify the judgments of a federal Court. Thus, the Supreme Court held that under
Article 111 of the Constitution, the federal courts have the final jurisdiction in all cases involving
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that the states therefore, cannot interfere with
federal Court judgments.)
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could not nullify the judgments of a federal Court Thus, the Supreme Court held that under
Article III of the Constitution, the federal courts have the final jurisdiction in all cases involving
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that the states therefore, cannot interfere with
federal Court judgments.) See also the U.S. Senate's civics website on the United States
Constitution, and its supremacy clause, that stated: "The 'supremacy clause' is the most important guarantor of national union. It
assures that the Constitution and federal laws and treaties take precedence over
state law[,] and binds all judges to adhere to that principle in their courts." (the
U.S. Senate's civics website on the United States Constitution, and its supremacy
clause, under the section on Article VI of United States Constitution, retrieved
from url: ("http://www.senate.gov/civics/Constitution_item/constitution.htm#a6''),
on October 26th, 2013, single grammatical change for readability and singled
quote marks mine)

C. Conclusion
Thus, it is very clear, the United States Constitution given its supremacy clause, overrules
this and any other Court, that holds the same view of Pro-se and Pro-per petitioners not being
awarded attorney fees due to their status in the legal system. Therefore, this Court's holding in
Curtis v. Campbe11 96 , that has stated the same, must now be voided and corrected by this Court,
so as to comply with the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States
Constitution 1° 2 . Stated a different way, regardless of how a party(s) or person(s) come or appear
before this or any other Court of law. Whether or not they be represented by formal legal
counsel, an attorney at law, or through that of their own representation, a party appearing Pro-se
or Pro-per, in courts oflaw in the United States of America, of which the State of Idaho is an
inseparable member of said union. Said Courts of law must award attorney fees and costs, where
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they would normally award them, to attorneys at law, or otherwise, lest this Court or any other,
render a decision that is not in compliance with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and its provision that no state shall deny any
person within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws.
Alternatively, if this Court shall decide against the Plaintiff in this appeal, or just on this
issue, the Plaintiff hereby points out a secondary public policy argument realized by the Idaho
Appeals Court, in Swanson & Setzke, Chtd. v.Henning 116 :

-

"However, this argument must be viewed in the context of a second additional
policy consideration - maintaining public confidence in the even-handed
administration of justice. It may be, as suggested above, that when a case has been
decided and a fee has been awarded, the defeated party cares not whether the fee is
retained by the prevailing party or paid over to separate counsel. However, before
the case is decided, it matters a great deal to each party whether, and to whom, a
fee may be awarded. This is especially true in cases where the amount of a
potential award is likely to be substantial in relation to the amount at stake in the
litigation. In such cases, the burden of attorney fees will profoundly affect the
choice of whether to file or defend a law suit and whether to engage counsel or to
litigate pro se.
The system would be one-sided, and would be viewed bv the public as unfair,
if one party (a lawyer litigant) could qualify for a fee award without incurring
the potential out-of-pocket obligation that the opposing party (a nonlawyer)
ordinarily must bear in order to qualify for a similar award. Moreover, if
both parties opt to litigate pro se, it would be palpably unjust for one of them
(the lawyer litigant) to remain eligible for an attornev fee award, while the
other becomes ineligible. As noted in Connor v. Cal-Az Properties, Inc., 137
Ariz. 53, 668 P.2d 896, 899 (Ct.App. 1983):
We cannot ... have one rule which provides for compensation to
attorneys when acting on their own behalf and another rule for lay persons
acting on their own behalf.... [T]he leverage which would be granted to
116

Swanson & Setzke, Chtd. v. Henning, supra

101 ,

at 913
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attorneys appearing on their own behalf could easily become oppressive
where the opposition is forced to incur legal expenses.
In our view, the public perception of fairness in the legal system is of greater
moment than a lawyer litigant's claim to an attorney fee award if he elects to
represent himself. For this reason, and because the other rationales for the general
rule against fee awards are applicable to lawyer and nonlawyer litigants alike, we
decline to carve out a special exception for lawyers prose." (Bolding and
underlining mine)
For simply, the Plaintiff hereby contends, that given the public policy argument above, of
the even-handed administration of justice, that such an award of Attorney's fees and Costs to the
Defendant would be one-sided, and would be viewed by the public as unfair, and palpably unjust
for one of them ( the lawyer) to remain eligible for an attorney fee award, while the other( the Prose party) becomes ineligible. Moreover, it would be tantamount to cruel and unusual punishment
prohibited 117 , and a violation of the even-handedness of this and any other Court in its
administration of justice, too award such extensive fees and costs against a person whom it
would create undue hardship and financial burden upon to pay 118 .

IV. Overall Conclusion and Prayer for Relief
As the Actor Matthew McConaughey roughly said in the 1996 movie adaptation of the
John Grisham novel a Time to Kill, "in all this legal maneuvering something got lost. That
something is the truth. It is incumbent upon us lawyers[, all of us really in fact, to] not to just talk
about the truth, but to actually seek it, to find it, to live it.'' The simple truth is, at least in this

117

See the 8th Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as Art. 1 § 6 of the Idaho
Constitution.
118 See also A1i. 1 § 15 of the Idaho Constitution.
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instant action, that the District Court plainly and outrightly erred, as to law, facts, and evidence
of this case, and even, in some instances, outright violated law. Thus, it is hereby the Plaintiff's
respectful recommendation to this Court that it find the same upon its review of this instant
action, and therefore, grant the Plaintiff's Prayer for Relieflisted below. Wherefore the Plaintiff
respectfully prays the following:
1) That this Court, if it is permissible, find for and award the Plaintiff the originally requested

relief from the trial Court below, subject to the Plaintiff's later discretionary review, setting,
and application to accommodate both the Plaintiff and Defendant, with the addition of
attorney's fees and/or costs herein incurred due to appeal, as well as attorney's fees and/or
costs incurred at the Court below. Alternatively, if the prior is not permissible, reverse and
if need be, remand the appropriate issues back to the lower Court for trial before a different
Judge, with the addition of attorney's fees and/or costs herein incurred due to appeal
awarded to the Plaintiff.
2) In addition, that this Cou11, upon a finding of disability discrimination and/or violations of
title two of the ADA, as amended, grant injunctive and/or declaratory relief against the
lower Court, as applicable, and require the affecting personnel. To issue to the Plaintiff, and
those appearing therewith, a written apology, as well as an similar public apology to those
with disabilities, along with attending and completing an accredited course on the original
ADA, as well as its 2008 to current amended version. Moreover, require the affecting
personnel attend constant counseling on discrimination, disabilities, and other civil rights
over a six month period, as well as be placed on a public probationary status of three years,
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during which if there occurs one reported case of discriminatory practices during their
employ, and it is proven by the standards set forth by law, including the ADA, to be true,
then they shall be fired and permentally removed from their position. Moreover, a
unfavorable mark be placed upon any permanent record of their employment in the Judicial
system.
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